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"To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly
allows him to do is a clue process violation of the most
basic sort . . . and for an agent of the State to pursue a
course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's
reliance ..on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitu-
tional. ,Mi
"Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the
exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when
and whether to institute criminals proceedings, or what
precise charge shall be made ..."
I. Introduction
3
A criminal defendant has a due process right to be free from being
punished for having exercised a right given him by the criminal justice system.
A prosecutor is held to have deprived a defendant of that due process right if
he increases the severity of existing charges with the intent to punish that
defendant for (or deter other defendants from) exercising a legal right. This
basic concept has not been disputed since it was first announced by the Supreme
1
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (citing Chaffin v.
Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1973)).
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
"[N]or (shall any person) be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. Amend. V (applicable to federal
prosecutions). "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. Amend XIV (applicable to
state prosecutions). Vindictive prosecution attacks on state convictions are
raised in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) (1977): "[A] district court
shall entertain an application for a write of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the
United States."

Court in Blackledge v. Perry , but what has been questioned is the criteria by
which to determine whether the prosecutor's intent is vindictive or within the
t
reasonable parameters of his discretion.
The first of the above quotations describes the due process right involved,
and the second illustrates the interest that causes the difficulty in reaching
appropriate criteria: judicial reluctance to intrude into a prosecutor's
charging discretion. The central issue in vindictive prosecution attacks on
harsher charges is whether the appearance that a prosecutor has acted vindic-
5
tively will be sufficient to establish a due process violation, or whether the
defendant must show actual vindictiveness.
The Supreme Court initially ruled that the appearance of vindictiveness,
without justification by the government, would suffice to establish the due
process violation, even if no actual intent to punish was proven. Some lower
federal courts then developed their own interpretations of this appearance of
evil standard, and in some cases required proof of actual vindictiveness. But
until recently the courts did not draw a distinction between retaliation by a
4
417 U.S. 21 (1974). See note 19 infra .
5
The term "vindictive prosecution" implies that a prosecutor acted from some
personal animosity towards a defendant. Animosity on the part of the prosecutor
has little to do with this area. The question is whether the prosecutor
retaliated (or appeared to have retaliated) because the defendant exercised a
right. The term "vindictive prosecution" obviously irritated the prosecutors I
interviewed, with good reason. The defense counsel I interviewed usually
assumed we were talking about "selective" prosecution, which refers not to
retaliation but selection of a particular defendant to prosecute under a
little-used law because of race, religion or Constitutional rights.

prosecutor prior to trial and retaliation after a conviction. In 1982 the
Supreme Court found that such a distinction existed, and established two
standards for deciding vindictive prosecution claims.
The Supreme Court has retreated from its initial approach that placed the
burden on the prosecution to justify increased charges brought after the
defendant had exercised a right. As the law now stands, it makes a great deal
of difference what right the defendant exercises and when the prosecutor
increases charges, for that will determine whether the defendant or the prose-
cution has the burden of persuasion. Because the burden shifts, this paper is
organized by the nature of the right exercised by the defendant. Section II
discusses appeals from convictions, when the defendant is then retried on more
serious charges. In that case the defendant is protected by a presumption that
the prosecutor acted vindictively, and the burden is on the prosecutor to show
he did not. Section III covers the opposite case, where harsher charges are
filed prior to the first trial. Here the defendant now has the burden of
proving that the prosecutor actually intended to retaliate against him. Section
IV discusses plea bargaining, an area the Supreme Court has excepted from the
due process protection against vindictiveness. Section V argues that when
harsher charges are brought after a mistrial a defendant should be entitled to
the same rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness that is applicable after a
conviction is reversed. Section VI discusses the most recent Supreme Court case
in this area, United States v. Goodwin and criticizes the Court's hint that in
457 U.S. 368 (1982). See text and footnotes infra, pages 17-22, 54-56

pretrial cases a defendant faces a presumption that a prosecutor did not act
vindictively. Section VII proposes several factors that should be considered in
deciding pretrial vindictive prosecution claims. Section VIII compares the
decision in United States v. DeMarco , with the probable result if that case
were decided under United States v. Goodwin , and the outcome under the analysis
proposed in this paper. Section IX summarizes the current state of the law and
contentions in this paper.
II. Retrials
The first Supreme Court decision on vindictiveness against a defendant
dealt with retaliation by a judge
,
not by a prosecutor. In North Carolina v.
o
Pearce the Court held that due process protected a defendant from increased
punishment by a sentencing judge because he appealed his first conviction.
Pearce involved the cases of two defendants who had successfully appealed their
convictions. They were retried on the original charges and each received a
7
550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
o
395 U.S. 711 (1969). Prior to North Carolina v. Pearce , the Supreme Court
of New Jersey held that "procedural fairness and principles of public policy"
prevented a defendant from being exposed to the death penalty after successfully
appealing his first degree murder conviction where he was sentenced to life
imprisonment. State v. Wolf, 216 A. 2d 586 (N.J. 1966). See Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Arizona v. Rumsey, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1984)
(double jeopardy precludes imposing death sentence when initial conviction
resulted in rejection of death sentence and sentencing proceedings resemble a
trial on the issue of sentencing).

longer prison sentence. The Court held that defendants who successfully
appealed convictions were entitled to the protection of a presumption that the
harsher prison sentence was vindictively imposed:
Due Process of Law, then, requires that vindictiveness
against a defendant for having successfully attacked his
first conviction must play no part in the sentence he
receives after a new trial. And since the fear of such
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's
right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction,
due process also requires that a defendant be freed of
apprehension of such ^retaliatory motivation on the part of
the sentencing judge.
The Court held in Pearce that before a judge could impose a harsher
sentence on a defendant at a retrial he must identify, on the record, "objective
Clifton Pearce was intitially sentenced by a North Carolina judge to a
twelve to fifteen year term. At his retrial he was sentenced to eight years,
but the new expiration date of his sentence was extended almost three years past
his original release date. Ld. at 713 n.l. Pearce was not sentenced by the
same judge at his second trial. See Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F. 2d 292, 299
n.l (5th Cir. 1977). The Court was not, therefore, seeking to protect a
defendant only from vindictiveness by an individual judge, but rather, to
protect him from "institutional" vindictiveness. But see Colten v. Kentucky,
infra
, note .15. The other defendant, Curtis Simpson, was initially sentenced by
an Alabama judge to ten years. At his retrial he was tried on less counts, yet
received a tv/enty-five year sentence, and was given no credit for the time he
had already served. Id. at 714. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake, Harsher
Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant
,
74 YALE L. J. 606, 611 (1974)
(proposing that harsher sentences at retrials impose an unconstitutional
condition on the right to a fair trial).
Id . at 725 (emphasis added). Pearce is not retroactive. Michigan v.
Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973).

information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occur-
11 i
ring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."
In Pearce the Court focused on the motivation of the sentencing judge. In
19
Chaffin v. Stynchombe , the Court declined to apply Pearce to a case where a
jury imposed a harsher sentence at the defendant's retrial. It concluded that
the potential for vindictiveness was negligible in a jury case if the jury was
13
not aware of the earlier sentence. Also, a jury would not have a "personal
14
stake in the prior conviction" or an interest in discouraging appeals. In
395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). A sentencing judge is not limited to
considering only a defendant's acts between the two sentencing proceedings. He
may consider an intervening conviction, even if the defendant's conduct that
leads to that conviction occurs prior to the first sentencing hearing. In
Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. , 82 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1984), the defendant
was first convicted for making false statements in a passport application and
received two years probation. This conviction was later reversed, and at his
retrial he was again convicted. In the interim he was convicted of possessing
counterfeit certificates of deposit. At his retrial on the passport offense the
same judge presided and sentenced the defendant to a two year unsuspended prison
term because of the intervening conviction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 700
F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
dispute between the circuits on this point. See United States v. Williams, 651
F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409 (2nd Cir. 1979).
The Court was unanimous in allowing the judge to consider the intervening
conviction. See also In Re Anthony M. , 64 Cal. App. 3d 464 (1976). (Minor was
given rehearing of juvenile court order removing him from custody of parents.
At the rehearing he was placed in the California Youth Authority. The harsher






412 U.S. 17 (1973).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27. Chaffin was a 5-4 decision. The dissenting justices argued
that Tearce should apply to jury resentencing and that the majority opinion
unduly burdened a defendant's right to a jury trial. J_d. at 35-46.

15
Colten v. Kentucky , the Court also declined to extend Pearce to a case where
the defendant exercised his right to a trial de novo and received a harsher
sentence when he was reconvicted. It concluded that the potential for
vindictiveness present in Pearce was not present in de novo trials of con-
victions from inferior courts because a different sentencing authority would
impose the second sentence, and inferior courts are designed only to be simple
and speedy forums to dispose of cases, not to provide constitutional protec-
17
tions.
In Pearce the defendants received harsher sentences after being reconvicted
of the same or lesser offenses. When a defendant is retried and sentenced for
more serious offenses, he is exposed to a higher maximum punishment, and the
sentencing judge is dealing with different charges, factors that make Pearce
inapplicable. The courts have generally decided that even if the more serious
charges arise from the same incident that led to the first conviction, the
1 o
defendant may be sentenced to a longer prison term.
407 U.S. 104 (1972)
Colten was convicted of disorderly conduct and fined ten dollars at his




See, e.g. Percy v. South Dakota, 443 F.2d 1232 (8th Cir.), cert, denied 404
U.S. 886 (1971) (after his first conviction for child molesting was reversed the
defendant was convicted of kidnapping, based on the same incident and sentenced
to life imprisonment. Pearce held inapplicable). See also United States v.
Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1974) (Pearce inapplicable when new count added
at retrial); United States Ex. Rel . Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1970), cert, denied 402 U.S. 914 (1971) ( Pearce attack unsuccessful because




In Blackledge v. Perry the Supreme Court extended the due process prohi-
bition against vindictiveness to a case where the prosecutor substituted a
felony for a misdemeanor charge after the defendant sought a trial de novo. In
1969 Jimmy Seth Perry was serving a prison term in the Odem Farm Unit of the
North Carolina Department of Corrections. He was convicted in state court of
misdemeanor assault on another inmate and sentenced to an additional six months
confinement. North Carolina allowed an automatic trial de novo from such
convictions. Perry took advantage of this opportunity, filed a request for a
trial de novo, and his original conviction was nullified. At this point the
prosecutor obtained a felony indictment for assault with intent to kill, based
20
on the same incident with the other inmate.
(Footnote Continued)
The Supreme Court of Alaska has interpreted its state constitution to forbid any
increase in the sentence when a defendant is retried on the same charge.
Shagloak v. State, 597 P. 2d 142 (1979). However, a longer sentence is
permissible if based on more serious charges even though they arise from the
same incident. Morgan v. State, 673 P. 2d 897 (Alaska App. 1983). But see
,
United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 994 (4th Cir„ 1984). In Whitley the
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of a four-count indictment and was
sentenced to twenty years. His conviction was vacated; he v/as convicted of all
four counts of the original indictment and sentenced by a different judge to
fifty years. The Fourth Circuit held that Pearce applied because Whitley was
initially sentenced for a lesser included offense of the offenses for which he
was convicted at his second trial. kL at 997 n.2. For a summary of cases
applying Pearce , see Annot. 12 A.L.R. 3d 978 (Supp. 1983). Increased punishment
may also result when the defendant is under a different parole eligibility after
the retrial; United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318 (3rd Cir. 1976).
19
417 U.S. 21 (1974). See Comment, Criminal Procedure: Protection of
Defendants Against Prosecutorial Vindictiveness , 54 N.C. L. REV. 108 (1975)




417 U.S. at 22-23.

Perry pled guilty to the felony and was sentenced to a term of five to
seven years. Although this sentence was to have been served concurrently with
21
his present sentence, it actually extended his term by seventeen months.
Perry successfully sought habeas corpus relief from the federal district court,
22





The Court extended Pearce to the actions of Perry's prosecutor." It
considered that a prosecutor had a stake in discouraging defendants from asking
for de novo trials as did a judge in discouraging appeals; both required
expending additional time on the same case. A prosecutor also has the power to
deter such requests by bringing felony charges in place of the original mis-
25demeanor charges, a step the Court referred to as "upping the ante."
21
The five to seven year term did not begin until the date of his guilty
plea, at which point Perry had served seventeen months of his original sentence.
jd. at 24 n.2.
22
The district court, in an unreported opinion, granted the writ on the
grounds that Perry's right to be free from double jeopardy had been violated.
Id. at 23. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, Perry v. Blackledge, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th
Cir. 1973). His petition had been denied at first by the district court for
failure to exhaust state remedies. That decision was reversed because North
Carolina had consistently rejected similar claims. Perry v. Blackledge, 453
F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1971).
23
414 U.S. 908 (1973).
24
"[I]n the situation here the central figure is not the judge . . . but the
prosecutor. The question is whether the opportunities for vindictiveness in
this situation are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law
requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case. We conclude that the




As it had done in Pearce , the Court emphasized that a defendant must not be
punished for exercising a right: "A person convicted of an offense is entitled
to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo without apprehension that the
State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one,
thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarcera-
tion." The most significant aspect of the decision is that Perry was not
required to show that the prosecutor had actually intended to punish him or
discourage other defendants:
There is, of course, no evidence that the prosecutor in this
case acted in bad faith or maliciously in seeking a felony
indictment against Perry. The rationale of our judgment in
the Pearce case, however, was not grounded upon the proposi-
tion that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably
exist. Rather, we emphasized that 'since the fear of such
vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's
exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant




The Court rejected the possible remedy of remanding for sentencing on the
oo
misdemeanor conviction. This was consistent with Pearce. In both cases the
7f\
Id. at 29. A felony conviction may also place a greater burden on a
defendant than a misdemeanor conviction. See The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Convicti on, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970). Thi cases dealing with
vindictive prosecution have focused mainly on the increase in the length of the
prison term caused by harsher charges.
27
Id . While this language could be interpreted to call for an irrebutable
presumption of vindictiveness, the Court allowed the prosecutor to justify
bringing the harsher charges. See footnote 33 infra .
Id . at 32 n.8. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that a remand for
resentencing in accordance with Pearce was the proper remedy. 417 U.S. at 40.
10

"punishment" imposed for exercising the right was set aside. In Pearce it was
the harsher sentence, in Blackledge it was the harsher charge."
Perry pled guilty to the felony at his de novo trial. Although the Supreme
Court had earlier decided that a plea of guilty waived a claim that a grand jury
29
was unconstitutionally selected, Perry's guilty plea did not waive the
vindictiveness issue. The Court treated the due process violation in his case
essentially as a jurisdictional defect, causing the state to lose the power to
30
bring the more serious felony charge.
Both Pearce and Blackledge allowed a defendant to establish a due process
violation without showing any actual intent on the part of either the judge or
the prosecutor to punish him. A sentencing judge after the Pearce decision is
31
limited to the sentence imposed at the first trial unless an increase can be
justified by "objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding"
32
which includes an intervening conviction. After Blackledge a prosecutor is
See Tollett v. Henderson 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
30
"[T]he right that he asserts and that we today accept is the right not to
be haled into court at all upon the felony charge." 417 U.S. at 32.
31
The Court also held in Pearce that a defendant was entitled on due process
and double jeopardy grounds to receive credit for time already served toward his
first conviction. 395 U.S. at 718
32
395 U.S. at 726 (emphasis added). See footnote 11, supra .
11

bound to the initial misdemeanor charge unless he can show that it was
33
"impossible" to proceed on the felony charge from the outset.
34
The circuit courts took different approaches in applying the Blackledge
decision. But it is not surprising that they did not all agree. The Supreme
Court did not distinguish between alleged retaliation by the prosecutor prior to
the first trial and retaliation after an appeal, although the facts in
Blackledge involved the second situation. Also, a felony was substituted for
the original misdemeanor, both based on the identical incident. A prosecutor
417 U.S. at 29-30. The Court cited Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442
(1912). In that case Gabriel Diaz beat up another man and was convicted of
misdemeanor assault and battery by a justice of the peace. Shortly afterward,
the victim died from the beating and Diaz was then convicted of homicide. He
claimed the homicide charge placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
The Supreme Court held that he had not been placed in jeopardy twice for the
same offense, because the element of death of the injured person was not present
at the first trial: "Then and not before, was it possible to put the accused in
jeopardy for that offense." Id. at 443 (emphasis added). The majority did not
address the fact that the Supreme Court of the Philippines doubled Diaz's
sentence when it heard his appeal, kh at 464-65; 467 (Lamar, J. dissenting).
See Note, Criminal Law - Exercise of Right to Trial De Novo - A Bar to
Subsequent Felony Prosecution for the Same Offense , 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 137
(19/5); Comment, Felony Charge After Appeal of Misdemeanor Conviction: Violation
of Due Process , 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 477 (1975) (arguing that Blackledge should
also apply after an appeal of a misdemeanor conviction).
34
See Note, Recent Developments, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: An Examina-
tion of Divergent Lower Court Standards and a Proposed Framework for Analysis
,
34 VAND. U. REV. 431 (198f) (reviewing the different standards and proposing
that vindictive prosecution cases can be decided under the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine): J. KNAPP, E. MARGOLIN, & N. ARGUIMBAU, PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION (1979). See also Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal
Appellate Process: Due Process Protection after United States v. Goodwin , 81
MICH. L. REV. 194, 203-206 (1982) (This excellent article divides circuits into
three categories: those with a balancing test to determine if a reasonable
likelihood of vindictiveness exists, those requiring the defendant to prove
actual vindictiveness, and those that presumed vindictiveness when charges
increased after exercise of a right.)
12

has two other ways he can expose a defendant to a harsher sentence: adding
charges or adding, habitual offender allegations. The courts 'had to decide how
to apply Blackledge not only when the severity of the charges was increased
after the first conviction, but prior to the first trial, and increased by
adding charges or habitual offender allegations. The Supreme Court has now
clarified that a defendant is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness only
when he faces harsher charges after a successful appeal. The different
approaches taken by the circuits between the Blackledge and Goodwin decisions
are now primarily of historical interest. But when the cases that dealt with
prosecutors bringing harsher charges after a successful appeal are examined they
show some general agreement on how to resolve vindictive prosecution claims and
one area of substantial disagreement.
To raise the appearance (or presumption) of vindictiveness the prosecutor
must first "up the ante," i.e., take some action to expose the defendant to a
35
harsher sentence after a successful appeal. Even if this was done by
re-charging the defendant with a more severe version of the same charge, or by
seeking to have a minor tried as an adult after he successfully attacked a
35
This will still be the result after Goodwi
n
. See Vardas v. Estelle, 715
F. 2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1983) ( Goodwi n presumption not raised when first trial
was on a capital offense, but his retrial only carried maximum sentence of life
imprisonment)
.
See, e.g., Lovett v. Butterworth, 610 F.2d 1002 (1st Cir. 1979), cert,
denied 447 U.S. 935 (1980) (after defendant petitioned for a de novo trial the
state prosecutor recharged the same burglary under a different section of
Massachusetts law that removed the possibility of a local jail sentence and
required confinement in state prison).
13

37juvenile court disposition, the courts applied Blackledge . However, where the
prosecutor simply.asked the judge to impose a longer sentence at a de novo trial
without increasing the severity of the charges, the appearance of vindictiveness
qo
was not created. A prosecutor did not up the ante when he vetoed a defen-
dant's request for a bench trial, even though this effectively avoided Pearce
39
and exposed the defendant to a longer sentence at his retrial. Also, where
the defendant faced federal charges after successfully appealing his state
40
conviction, Blackledge was held to be inapplicable.
37
See in re David B. , 68 Cal . App. 3d 931 (1977) (after minor successfully
attacked adjudication as a ward of the court, prosecutor petitioned to have him
tried as an adult which now exposed minor to a prison sentence). But one
military court has declined to apply Blackledge when criminal charges were
brought after a disappointing result in a non-criminal forum. See United States
v. Williams, 12 M.J. 1038 (A.C.M.R. 1982) (vindictiveness not raised when
serviceman court-martialed after unsuccessful attempt to have him
administratively discharged). Even after the Goodwin decision a military
defendant in this situation should not be entitled to a presumption because he
has not exercised an appeal right within the court-martial process.
38
In Koski v Samaha, 648 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1981) a demonstrator requested a
de novo trial on a criminal trespass charge. The prosecutor publicly threatened
to ask for a six month sentence, but at trial recommended that two months be
suspended. The defendant's vindictive prosecution attack was rejected because
the sentence was within the range of earlier sentences given other
demonstrators. B ut see Comment, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: Expanding the
Scope of Protection to Increased Sentence Recommendations
, 70 GEO. L. J. 1051
(1982) (arguing that prosecutor's threat should have been sufficient for the
courts to find vindictiveness). The focus here is on the prosecutor, but it is
important to remember that Pearce limits the sentencing judge at a retrial. The
prosecutor who tries to persuade a judge to impose a harsher sentence at a
retrial without introducing evidence is inviting the judge to impose an invalid
sentence.
See Cooper v. Mitchell, 647 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 1981) (vindictiveness
not raised because defendant had been tried by a jury at his first trial and
whatever vindictiveness that was present was "neutralized" because the second
jury did not know about the first sentence); Va. R. Crim. P. 3A:19(b).
40




The courts generally agreed on how to resolve vindictiveness attacks that
resulted from the. prosecutor's adding an habitual offender allegation. If the
prosecutor knew the defendant could be charged as an habitual offender at his
first trial but filed the allegation after a successful appeal, the courts had
41
no difficulty finding vindictiveness.
But when the prosecutor knew of other charges that could be filed at the
first trial yet did not bring those charges until the defendant was to be
retried after a successful appeal, the courts were less consistent. The Fourth
42
Circuit upheld a claim of vindictiveness in that situation, as did one state
(Footnote Continued)
of vindictiveness raised when defendant was tried on federal charges after his
state conviction was reversed. The charges in that case arose from separate
transactions and the defendant was not exposed to a longer sentence); United
States v. De Michael, 692 F.2d, 1059, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[U]nder our
federal system there can be simultaneous federal and state prosecutions where
similar or identical offenses under the two systems of law are committed . . .
(and) . . . there is nothing more than exercise of normal prosecutorial
discretion involved if the prosecuting attorney is satisfied to drop one
prosecution if an adequate result is obtained in the other, or decides to
proceed in the second case if an inadequate result is obtained in the first.");
United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 68 (2nd Cir. 1983).
See , e.g., James V. Rogriguez, 553 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1977) (habitual
offender allegation added after first conviction reversed); Miracle v. Estelle,
592 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant initially tried on robbery charge
alleging one prior conviction. After reversal tried on same charge with two
prior convictions alleged, which exposed him to a life sentence. Vindictiveness
established and conviction reversed. At his third trial, he still was sentenced
to fifty years. Miracle v. State, 604 S. W. 2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
Goodwin should not change this result, and two state courts have held that
adding available habitual offender allegations after a mistrial raises a
presumption of vindictiveness. See Twiggs v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 360,
194 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1983); Murphy v. State, 453 N. E. 2d 219 (Ind. 1983).
In United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1976) the defendant
initially pled guilty to two counts of a four-count indictment. He later had




court. But other courts took the position that adding separate charges at a
retrial did not raise the same due process concerns present in Blackledge . But
when the cases are examined, only one circuit distinguished adding charges based
44
on separate acts from other forms of tipping the ante. The Fifth Circuit, in
45
Hardwick v. Doolittle , held that where separate and distinct acts are the
(Footnote Continued)
indictment. Johnson was actually tried on seven additional counts and one of
the original counts. The prosecution conceded it knew of the facts supporting
the thirty-seven additional counts before Johnson pled at his first trial. The
conviction of the original court was affirmed and the rest vacated. The
prosecution could, however, retry him on the other three original counts, J_d. at
1173-1175.
In Cherry v. State, 414 N.E. 2d 301 (Ind.) cert , dismissed 453 U.S. 946
(1981). The prosecution dismissed two counts of a three-count indictment prior
to trial. After a new trial on the remaining count was granted, the defendant
was tried on three counts. No explanation was offered by the prosecution even
through the court said it would accept new evidence or honest mistake to dispel
the appearance of vindictiveness.
44
See Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant tried on
burglary charge after appeal of kidnapping conviction reversed. Although both
charges based on same incident they were considered separate. But the second
charge carried a lesser maximum sentence than did the first); United States v.
Rodriguez, 429 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (separate tax evasion charges filed,
but defendant had only filed an unsuccessful appeal, and the separate charges
were tried in a separate prosecution); United States v. Partyka, 561 F. 2d 118
(separate felony indictment brought after appeal, but consolidated against the
prosecutor's request, and prosecutor had legitimate reason (protection of
informant) for not bringing charge from the outset.) In United States v.
Mallah, 503 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1974) separate heroin counts were substituted for
cocaine counts at the earlier trial. The court noted that a vindictiveness
argument would have "some force" if a charge had been added that arose from the
same transaction. _Id. at 987-988. See also United States v. Computer Sciences
Corp., 511 F. Supp 1125 (E.D. Va. 1981) (after defendant was acquitted at first
trial he was tried on a separate charge which did not carry a harsher penalty);
United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (fact that
separate charges are filed is a "key indicia" they are not vindictively
motivated. But in that case the federal charges were filed after a state
prosecution and the maximum sentence was not more severe).
558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434 U.S. 1049 (1978). In




bases for added charges at a retrial, actual vindictiveness must be established,
.
.
. . .. .. 45 9
not simply apparent vindictiveness.
47
In United States v. Goodwin ' the Court may have resolved which standard to
apply when harsher charges are based on separate incidents when it established
two standards to be used in deciding vindictive prosecution claims. In that
case the Court held that where harsher charges are brought after a successful
appeal the defendant is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness.
In 1976 Learly Goodwin was stopped for speeding on the Baltimore-Washington
Parkway by a United States Park Policeman. He left his car, showed his drivers
license and registration. The policeman noticed a plastic bag under the armrest
and told Goodwin to get into the car and raise the armrest. Goodwin got back in
the car but suddenly accelerated, "fishtailed," and hit the officer who was
thrown on the back of the car and then to the ground. A high speed chase
(Footnote Continued)
employees and assault on three policemen during a shoot out after the robbery.
His conviction was declared void because he was tried before a petition for
removal of his state trial to federal court was answered. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
1443 (1973); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(e) (Supp. 1983). He was then indicted and tried
on a superceding indictment that contained an additional charge of armed robbery
of a bank customer and a charge of assaulting a probation officer he used as a
shield during the shoot out, both arising from the same bank robbery. The Fifth
Circuit held that these two charges "were different and distinct activities and
thus were the subjects of discretionary prosecutorial decisions which up to then
had not been made." 558 F.2d at 302. Because they were not "harsher
variations" of an original charge, the court required that it be established
that a prosecutor's "motives are in fact vindictive." jd_.
46
The case was remanded to the district count to allow the prosecution to
show the reasons for bringing the additional counts. J_d. at 302-03.
457 U.S. 368 (1982) (affirmed after remand in United States v. Goodwin, 676
F.2d 14 (4th Cir.), cert, denied 457 U.S. 1125 (1982)).
17

followed, but Goodwin escaped capture. He was later arrested and appeared
before a federal magistrate. A trial date on misdemeanor and "petty offenses of
speeding, reckless driving, failing to give aid, fleeing from 'a police officer,




Three years later, in May of 1979, Goodwin was returned to Maryland after
being convicted in Virginia on drug and assault charges and receiving an
49 50
eighteen-year prison sentence. Plea negotiations failed because Goodwin
insisted on pleading not guilty and he demanded a jury trial. His case was then
51
transferred to the district court. ' The Assistant United States Attorney
assigned at that point obtained a four-count indictment that substituted felony




Before seeking the indictment that was to generate the vindictiveness
claim, the Assistant United States Attorney contacted the Virginia authorities
and was told that Goodwin had received fifteen years for possession of heroin
and three years for attempting to shoot the police officer who was arresting him
for possession of heroin. He was also told that Goodwin was believed to be a
heroin dealer, had falsely claimed to be in Atlanta when the incident occurred,
and had failed to appear for his first trial on the Virginia charges. Affidavit
of Mr. Edward M. Norton, Jr., United States v. Goodwin 457 U.S. 368 (1982)
(available 1 November 1983 on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Sup. Ct. Briefs).
50
The attorney assigned to Goodwin's case after he was returned to Maryland
was on a two-week assignment to try petty offenses and misdemeanors and did not
have authority to seek felony indictments. 457 U.S. at 370-71.
51
At the time magistrates could not conduct jury trials. J_d. at 371, n.l; 18
U.S.C.A. § 3401(b) (Supp. 1983). The present version of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3401(b)
allows magistrates to conduct jury trials but the defendant may still elect to




assault on a police officer. At his trial Goodwin unsuccessfully moved for
dismissal of that. felony count on the ground it was the result of prosecutorial
. .... 53 f
vindictiveness.
Goodwin appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the district
54
court. The Fourth Circuit viewed the facts as creating a "genuine risk of
55
retaliation" by the prosecutor. ^ This required the government to show that the
harsher charges " could not have been brought before the defendant exercised his
56
rights." The information about Goodwin's criminal record had not been in the
hands of the first prosecutor when his case was before the magistrate. However,
the Fourth Circuit considered that it was available prior to his request for a
57jury trial. For this reason it rejected the government's argument that
because the second prosecutor had new evidence to support the felony indictment,
52
The original charges exposed Goodwin to twenty-eight months in prison. 457
U.S. 387, n.l (Brennan, J. concurring) The indictment exposed him to a fifteen
year sentence. Id. at 388, n.3.
53
The district court opinion is not reported, the motion was filed after
Goodwin was found guilty. The judge excused the requirement that motions be
filed prior to pleas because Goodwin's attorney inadvertently delayed filing the
motion. United States v. Goodwin, No. HM-79-1298 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 1979)
(available 1 November 1983 on LEXIS, Genfed Library, Sup. Ct. Briefs). See also
Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b), (f).













The majority opinion acknowledged that Blackledge created a presumption of
vindictiveness in retrial cases:
[T]he Court emphasized in Blackledge that it did not matter
that no evidence was present that the prosecutor had acted
in bad faith or with malice in seeking the felony indict-
ment. As in Blackledge
,
the Court held that the likelihood
of vindictiveness justified a presumption that would free
defendants of apprehension of fSjjch a retaliatory motivation
on the part of the prosecutor.
This presumption is justified by an "institutional bias" against retrial of
cases and by an implicit assumption that by the time the first trial is
completed the prosecutor will have completed his investigation and evaluation of
. . 60
his case.
By establishing a standard of presumed vindictiveness in retrial cases the
Supreme Court has overruled by implication the Fifth Circuit decisions that
called for a "balancing" of interests to determine if presumed or actual
58
United States v. Goodwin 454 U.S. 1079 (1981).
59
457 U.S. at 3/6. The Court was unanimous on this point. The concurring
and dissenting opinions only addressed the standard to apply when the "ante is





vindictiveness would be the test. In a retrial case the issues are now
whether the prosecution has upped the ante, and if so, has the presumption been
adequately rebutted. After Goodwin a defendant raises a substantial attack on
harsher charges by bringing a pretrial motion to dismiss them alleging the
prosecution has upped the ante following his successful appeal or request for a
trial de novo. Upping the ante may take the form of substituting a felony for a
misdemeanor, adding an habitual offender allegation or adding charges. But if
the changes will not increase the potential sentence, the threshold requirement
that the ante be upped will not be established and no presumption of vindictive-
cn
ness is raised. Also, if federal charges are brought after a state conviction
fii
The Fifth Circuit has held subsequent to Goodwi
n
that when the prosecutor
increases the severity of charges after a successful appeal, no presumption is
created "[i]f any objective event or combination of events . . . should indicate
to a reasonable minded defendant that the prosecutor's decision to increase the
severity of charges was motivated by some purpose other than a vindictive desire
to deter or punish appeals ..." United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360,
1365 (5th Cir. 1983), cert, denied 104 S. Ct. 1416 (1984). In Krezdorn the
defendant was initially charged with five counts of forging immigration
documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1426(a). At trial evidence of thirty-two
other forgeries was introduced and he was convicted of four counts. His
conviction was reversed on the grounds that admitting evidence of the uncharged
forgeries was error. United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (1981). The
prosecutor then charged him with conspiring to forge immigration documents and
the four forgeries. The district court dismissed the conspiracy count for
vindictiveness which was affirmed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit relying on
Goodwin . United States v. Krezdorn, 693 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1982). * On
rehearing the case en banc the Fifth Circuit reversed. 718 F. 2d at 1365. The
en banc decision, as written, cannot be squared with Goodwin . The most
reasonable interpretation is that the Fifth Circuit views the Goodwi n
presumption as a method to establish actual motivation, and since the trial
court made a finding that no actual vindictiveness existed, dismissal was
unwarranted. But this must be implied from the decision and is directly
contrary to Blackledge , because actual motivation is irrelevant in retrial
cases.
See Vardas v. Estelle, 715 F.2d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 1983) ( Goodwin
presumption not raised when first trial was for capital offense, but retrial
carried maximum sentence of life imprisonment).
21

a defendant will not be successful in claiming vindictiveness even if the
C *3
federal charge is„.based on the same transaction.
Once the prosecution has upped the ante the Goodwin presumption can be
rebutted, but only by objective evidence of legitimate and non-vindictive
reasons for increasing the severity of the charges. This means something other
than a statement from the prosecutor that his motives were pure. For example, a
claim that the prosecutor was just "reforming" an indictment when he filed
64
harsher charges was held, prior to Goodwin to be insufficiently objective.
Also, a claim that a recidivist allegation was brought for the first time at a
defendant's retrial because state law made filing those allegations mandatory
was held to be insufficient when the allegation was known to the prosecution and
65
could have been filed prior to the first trial. Also, even though a defendant
will be eligible for parole at the same time under the harsher charges does not
affect the fact that the ante has been upped where he was tried on charges that
on their face carried a harsher sentence.
See United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1983) (vindictiveness
attack not available when harsher charges brought at separate trial by separate
sovereign); United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 1983).
See Ronk v. State 578 S.W. 2d 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (defendant's
conviction of injury to a child reversed, then prosecutor charged him with
murdering the child. "Reforming" argument rejected because prosecutor knew
child was dead before defendant's first trial).
65
James v. Rodriquez, supra note 41 at 62.
Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra note 45 at 300 (parole will be affected by the
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affected by the Supreme Court. It is important to bear in mind, however, that
the burden to rebut the presumption is on the prosecution.
Can a distinction be made (and no presumption created) when the added
charges are based on separate actions by the defendant, even though arising from
the transaction that led to the first charges? The prosecution cannot deny
knowledge of the facts supporting the added charge if they occurred during the
same event that led to the first trial. Once on notice of these facts, if
charges are not filed, the prosecutor has made a discretionary determination not
72
to bring them to trial. The rationale for the retrial presumption of
vindictiveness in the Goodwin decision is that by the end of the first trial a
prosecutor will have made that discretionary decision:
"The (retrial) presumption again could be overcome by objective evidence
justifying the prosecutor's action." 457 U.S. at 376 n.8. It has been
suggested that the prosecutor can only rebut the presumption if he subsequently
discovered new evidence about the defendant which would include evidence that
could have been discovered with due diligence prior to the first trial. See 81
MICH. L. REV. at 215-217. Limiting rebuttal to new evidence solely about the
defendant is not supported by an analogy to Pearce , for the Supreme Court has
expanded the scope of evidence that would justify a harsher sentence under
Pearce to include the intervening event of a conviction on unrelated charges.
See Wasman v. United States, supra note 11. Also, an appellate decision after
the first trial may now enable the prosecution to introduce evidence that it was
unable to introduce at the first trial. Rebuttal evidence should also include
intervening developments that justify increasing the severity of the charges.
The point that the prosecution must also show it could not have discovered the
evidence by exercising due diligence is sound, for it precludes raising what is
a subjective argument: that the initial prosecution was affected by a mistake
or oversight. The reader should compare the Michi gan proposal with the shallow
treatment of the issue in Note, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Claims




Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra , note 45.
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[0]nce a trial begins—and certainly by the time a
conviction has been obtained—it is much more likely that
the State has discovered and assessed all of the information
against an accused and has made a determination, on the
basis of that information, of the extent to which he should
be prosecuted . Thus a change in the charging decision made
after an initial trial is completed is much more Kk.ely to
be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision.
When a prosecutor attempts to justify adding separate charges by pointing
out that the defendant has not been tried on the added charges, or that no
decision to prosecute them was made prior to the first trial, he is essentially
saying that he has changed his mind, and the court should let him do it because
he has prosecutorial discretion. But reliance by a prosecutor on his discretion
misses the point. The due process protection against vindictiveness is already
a limitation on that discretion. The concerns about a prosecutor retaliating or
generating apprehension that a defendant who is foolhardy enough to appeal will
be punished are not overcome by the questionable distinction between separate
acts within a transaction. There may be a legitimate reason for adding those
74
charges, but the fact that they are based on separate acts within a trans-
75
action, if known to the prosecution should not rebut the presumption.
73
Id . at 381 (emphasis added).
74
The Fifth Circuit has suggested that "mistake or oversight in the initial
action, a different approach to prosecutorial duty by a successor prosecutor, or
public demand for prosecution on the additional crimes" would "negate
vindictiveness." Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra note 45 at 301. See also , Cherry
v. State, 414 N.E. 2d 301 (Ind. 1981) (court should accept showing of honest
mistake as well as new evidence to rebut appearance of vindictiveness.)
"flistake" or "different approach" should not be acceptable rebuttal evidence
because they are subjective characterizations of earlier actions by a prosecutor
who has increased the severity of charges after an appeal.
75




The same conclusion should be reached if the prosecution adds separate and
76
unrelated charges- to those being retried. If these additional charges were
known at the time of the first conviction, the prosecution ha,d the opportunity
to consider them in determining the extent to which the defendant should be
prosecuted. Even though this change in the charging decision involves separate
crimes, the perception by the defendant facing retrial and other defendants is
the same: that the prosecutor is retaliating for this successful appeal, and
will retaliate against other defendants. An objection can be raised that this
view is tantamount to saying that due process requires the prosecution to bring
(Footnote Continued)
the defendant was initially convicted of reckless driving, driving while his
license was revoked, driving on the wrong side of the road, and driving while
intoxicated. He appealed for a trial de novo of these misdemeanor convictions.
He was then indicted and convicted of manslaughter arising from the death of a
passenger in the truck he hit with his car. 82 L. Ed 2d at 27. The district
court granted his habeas corpus petition on due process and double jeopardy
grounds and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, only on double jeopardy grounds. In
affirming, the Supreme Court relied on Rlackledge . It refused to accept the
argument that since manslaughter involves separate elements from the traffic
offenses, Blackledge was inapplicable:
In both courts below, the State attempted to
distinguish Blackledge on the ground that the misdemeanor
and felony at issue in that case shared specific elements in
a way that traffic violations and manslaughter do not. . . .
Even if the state is correct that the offenses charged in
Blackledge had more in common than those charged here, this
parsing of the statue misses the point. Blackledge engaged
in no such analysis. It noted merely that the 'indictment
covered the same conduct for which Perry had been tried and
convicted.
'
82 L. Ed. 2d at 29 (citations emitted).
~j c
See Note , A "Realistic Likelihood of Vindictiveness": Due Process
Limitations on Prosecutorial Charging Discretion
,
1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 693,
719-20 (addition of charges has a chilling effect on exercise of rights, and
courts should not assume prosecution did not know of them prior to first trial).
6

all known charges against a defendant from the outset, on pain of losing those
not filed should -the defendant successfully appeal. But the issue of vindic-
tiveness is not raised simply because the prosecution brought the defendant to
trial for separate crimes, but that it did so in a manner that ups the ante
against a particular defendant: adding them to the original charges being
78
retried. The same realistic likelihood of vindictiveness that is present when
a prosecutor substitutes a felony for a misdemeanor therefore exists when a
79
prosecutor adds previously known charges to those being retried, and a
defendant should be entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness.
Although not required to do so by due process, a prosecutor may be required
by statute or regulation to bring all known charges. See , e.g., GA CODE
§ 16-1-7 (1977) (formerly § 26-506); Curry v. State, 281 S.E. 2d 604 (Ga. 1981)
(all charges must be tried at a single trial, if known to the prosecution). The
Armed Forces has a similar policy. See R.C.M. 306(b) Manual for Courts Martial,
United States (1984).
IP
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. at 27.
7g
Unless barred by a statute of limitations, the charges may be tried at a
separate proceeding. Also, the prosecution may be unable to join them to the
original charges. See , e.g., F. R. Crim. P. 8(a): "Two or more offenses may be
charged in the same indictment ... if the offenses . . . are of the same or
similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan." The trial judge also has the discretion to sever charges if their
joinder prejudices a defendant's defense at trial. See, e.g., F. R. Crim. P.
14. The defendant must show actual vindictiveness if he is tried at a separate
trial on unrelated charges. The Department of Justice's dual prosecution
policy—that it may not prosecute a defendant who is already serving a prison
sentence— can lead to prosecution after a defendant successfully appeals that
conviction. It has been held that following that policy and prosecuting a
defendant on separate offenses after his first conviction was reversed and
resulted in an acquittal does not raise any inference of vindictiveness. United
States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358, 364 (11th Cir. 1983) (The court "doubted" that a
presumption applied where a defendant was prosecuted on tax violations after his
conviction for drug offenses was reversed and he was acquitted. But because tax
offenses were based on new evidence the court went on to hold that no
vindictiveness, presumed or actual, was shown).
27

Discovery of new evidence about a defendant will clearly rebut any
presumption of vindictiveness. But "new evidence" should not "be limited solely
to evidence about the defendant's conduct. In Pearce the Supreme Court did say
that a sentencing judge can only base a more severe sentence on information
abcut a defendant's conduct after the first sentencing hearing. But it has
recently held that a sentencing judge can consider an intervening conviction
that was not based on conduct after the first sentencing. A prosecutor should
be allowed to rebut by showing a new development that would reasonably lead to a
new charging decision, even though it does not specifically involve the
defendant.
Once a prosecutor ups the ante after a successful appeal, the primary issue
is whether he can meet his burden to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness
that arises. But when he increases the severity of existing charges prior to
the first trial, a different standard is applied. It is in this area that the
Supreme Court in Goodwin shifted the burden to the defendant. When the ante is
upped prior to trial, the defendant now has the burden of proving that the
prosecutor was actually vindictive when he increased the severity of the charges
after the defendant successfully exercised a constitutional or statutory right.
III. Pretrial
In Blackledge the Supreme Court did not limit the due process protection
against retaliation solely to cases where the defendant's conviction is set
aside. In fact, the Court emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not
28

the basis for their decision. The potential for retaliation by a prosecutor
prior to trial also exists, and was recognized by the lower courts. A defendant
may exercise a right that makes the prosecutor's job harder and the prosecutor
has the power to punish a defendant (and deter other defendants) by increasing
his exposure to prison. After Blackledge and before Goodwin lower courts
generally did not distinguish between alleged retaliation after an appeal from a
conviction and retaliation after exercise of a pretrial right.
For example, the Ninth Circuit applied a presumption of vindictiveness test
when the retaliation (a two-count felony indictment) occurred after the
defendant refused to plead guilty to a misdemeanor or consent to have his case
81
heard by a federal magistrate. The Fifth Circuit also applied Blackledge in a
case where an additional count was added to an existing indictment after the
op
defendant refused to plead guilty.
The Sixth Circuit applied Blackledge to a case where two defendants
successfully obtained their release on bail over the objection of the
fin
See United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 248 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert, denied
103 S. Ct. 102 (1982) (declining to decide whether vindictiveness concept
inapplicable as no vindictiveness found in case). But see , State v. Stevens, 96
N.M. 627, 633 P. 2d 1225 (N.M. 1981) infra Note 101."
pi
United States, v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976)
(prosecution aware alien was multiple offender when misdemeanor charge of
unlawful entry filed under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1325 (1970). Two-count felony
indictment filed alleging defendant was a multiple offender and reentered
country after deportation. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (1970)).
on
United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1979) (reindictment




prosecutor, followed by the prosecutor charging them with an additional count of
oo
conspiracy to commit the initial offenses. The standard adopted was whether a
"realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness was raised by the facijs of a particular
case. The prosecution was of course entitled to disprove this likelihood, but
the argument that the first prosecutor had simply made a mistake would not be
sufficient. However, the court would consider evidence that the prosecutor was
85
inexperienced or had problems scheduling the grand jury hearing.
The nature of the pretrial right exercised by a defendant did not make a
great deal of difference to the outcome. Blackledge was held to apply when the
defendant successfully exercised a variety of pretrial rights such as: moving
86
to dismiss a charge under the Speedy Trial Act, asserting a right to a change
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert,
denied 450 U.S. 927 (1981). One panel of the Sixth Circuit had been unable to"
reach agreement on the standard to apply, see United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d
235 (6th Cir. 1980). In the en banc decision the Sixth Circuit did not require
actual vindictiveness be established, because that would require a judge to call
the prosecutor a "liar" if he did not accept the reasons for increasing the
charges, but the court did not accept an appearance of vindictiveness standard.
633 F.2d at 455. The district court had applied the Ninth Circuit presumption
standard, see United States v. Andrews, 444 F.Supp. 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See
also 25 VILL. L. REV. 365 (1979) (reviews first decision of Sixth Circuit and
suggests that actual vindictiveness standard is consistent with Blackledge ).
84
633 F.2d at 455.
_Id. at 456. See United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977)
(review of file by a new prosecutor justified superceding indictment that
substituted felony count for original misdemeanor and added a felony count based
on same transaction)
.
United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450,452-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor
maintained that felony charges were brought after defendant did not live up to
agreement to cooperate with federal agents. This argument was rejected because
the defendant had told agents from the outset he would not testify). See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3161(b) (supp. 1983).
30

of venue, moving to dismiss an indictment because the government had failed to
preserve an agent's notes, ' refusing to enter pleas by a specific date and
89 :
seeking judicial sanctions against the prosecutor, successfully pleading nolo
90
contendre over the objection of the prosecutor, obtaining a continuance to
91
investigate the legality of a search, moving for dismissal of a count because
92
the judge had not properly executed the summons and charges, ' moving to
93
suppress evidence, refusing to waive a claim that an earlier motion to dismiss
07
United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 434 U.S.
827 (1977).
United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1347-48 (9th Cir.), cert, denied
449 U.S. 863 (1980) (trial judge did not abuse discretion in finding no
appearance of vindictiveness because unrelated government agencies investigated
case, separate conduct was charged, and no indication that second investigation
and additional charges were unreasonably delayed).
QQ
United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (vindictiveness not
found because new evidence discovered).
90
United States v. Veliscol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.C. 1980)
(actual vindictiveness shown by threats and fact government indicted individual
officers instead of corporation after plea to misdemeanor charge accepted).
United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval , 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977)
(information known to U.S. Attorney's office when misdemeanor complaint filed.
Held immaterial that attorney who initially appeared did not personally know of
defendant's prior record.).
92
Adams v. State, 48 Md. App. 447, 428 A. 2d 447 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
(followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goodwin ).
• United States v. O'Brien, 123 Ariz. 575, 601 P. 2d 338 (Ct. App. 1979) (even
though prosecution and defense agreed sentence would not exceed maximum for
involuntary manslaughter, the defendant was prejudiced by having to defend
against a murder charge); United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1980)
(federal prosecution followed state trial where charges were dismissed.






had been withdrawn because of threat to add a harsher charge moving to
95
consolidate a tdal with that of sixteen other defendants, ' moving for
96
dismissal of vague counts in an indictment, or electing trial before a
97
district court judge instead of a magistrate.
One circuit defined the right protected as one carrying "due process
implications" that affected a defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. A
demand, prior to indictment, for the return of funds confiscated at the
98
U.S. -Canadian border was held not to be that kind of right. Claiming the
right against self incrimination before a grand jury also has been held not to
99
raise vindictiveness. But neither of these situations involved exercising a
94
Atchak v. State, 640 P. 2d 135 (Alaska App. 1981).
95
United States v. Schiller, 424 A. 2d 51,56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (appearance
of vindictiveness raised by additional counts, but rebutted by prosecutor's
change of mind after trials were consolidated, and "slight" government interest
in preventing consolidated trials); Wynri v. United States, 386 A. 2d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) ( Blackledge applies when additional charges brought after dismissal
of original charges for want of prosecution).
y
United States v. Farinas, 308 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (no
vindictiveness as maximum sentence not increased).
97
United States v. Lippi, 435 F.Supp. 808 (D. N.J. 1977) (initially charged
with misdemeanor, defendant told that felony charges would be filed if he did
not elect trial before a magistrate. Six felony counts returned after he
demanded district court trial. Prosecutor could not rebut apparent
vindictiveness because evidence supporting felonies was known shortly after
misdemeanor charges filed).
no
United States v. Staley, 571 F.2d 440,443 (8th Cir. 1978).
qq
In Re DeMonte, no. 81-2804 (7th Cir. Dec. 10 1981); United States v.
Linton, 655 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1980). See United States v. Walker, 514 F.Supp.
294 (E.D. La. 1981) (extensive discussion of Fifth Circuit cases, but




right after the first charges are filed, so vindictiveness was actually not in
issue. One court- held that Blackledge does not apply when a defendant requests
a continuance prior to trial, even if then charged with a felony. The
Supreme Court of Mew Mexico has also ruled that Blackledge did not apply when a
101
defendant moved to suppress evidence and was then charged with murder.
One pretrial right that carries due process implications is the right to a
jury trial. It was a demand for a jury trial that began the chain of events
leading to Learly Goodwin's felony indictment. After he refused to waive jury
trial his case file was assigned to a new prosecutor. While preparing for trial
that prosecutor contacted the complaining officer and investigated Goodwin's
(Footnote Continued)
See also , United States v. Peters, 625 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1980) ( Blackledge
inapplicable when defendant alleges original charges brought because he would
not incriminate another person).
100
Washington v. United States, 434 A. 2d 394, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ( Blackledge
limited to harsher treatment after conviction set aside). Contra , United States
v. Ruesga-Martinez, supra note 79; United States v. Schiller, Wynn v. United
States, supra note 95.
101
State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 627, 633 P. 2d 1225 (1981). In Stevens the
defendant was initially charged with assault and alternative counts of voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter. He moved to suppress evidence and a second
indictment was then filed, charging second degree murder. The motion to
suppress was granted and the defendant successfully moved to quash the second
indictment because it was filed while the first was pending. The prosecutor
then obtained a third indictment containing an "open" charge of murder. The
trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss but the appeals court reversed,
holding that a presumption arose. The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed. JkL
at 1225-26. The court noted the different approaches taken by the circuit
courts and that the Supreme Court had never applied a presumption in pretrial
cases, and held that vindictiveness would not be presumed in pretrial cases.
in?
See United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307,309 n.2 (6th Cir. 1977)
(additional counts were filed after defendant demanded a jury trial, but
actually tried on charges carrying a lesser penalty than original).
33

background. He discovered that Goodwin had been convicted in California and
Virginia, had a lengthy criminal record, and was suspected of extensive drug
103 ''
dealings. It was after he had conducted this investigation that he obtained
104
the felony indictment. Goodwin moved to dismiss the felony count of assault
on a federal officer, alleging it was brought to retaliate for his demanding a
jury trial. The trial judge agreed that the appearance of vindictiveness had
been raised, but also found that the prosecution had adequately dispelled the
105
appearance because of the additional information.
The Fourth Circuit held that the additional information gathered by the
prosecutor did not dispel the apparent vindictiveness because that information
was available before Goodwin demanded a jury trial:
Although the information which led the United States Attor-
ney to seek a felony indictment may not have been in his
possession until defendant exercised his right to a jury
trial and the case was transferred from the magistrate to
the district court, the information was available to the
government if not from the outset-, at least prior to
Goodwin's election of a jury trial.
103
104
See note 49 supra .
A person's criminal record or involvement in criminal activity is a
recognized factor bearing on a prosecutor's charging decision. See ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, §§ 3.9,
1.1, 2.5 (Approved Draft 1971); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION, 9 (1980) (hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION).
105 c . coSee note 53 supra .
106
United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d at 255.
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The Supreme Court did not address the issue of what evidence the prose-
cution will be held to know when individual prosecutors make charging decisions.
Instead, it treated the issue as simply involving presumptions and declined to
apply what it called "an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness
in a pretrial setting." It gave four reasons for not applying a presumption
of vindictiveness when a prosecutor retaliated prior to trial: prior to trial
the prosecution may not have all the evidence, defendants are expected to
exercise rights that make a prosecutor's job more difficult, a prosecutor should
remain free prior to trial to exercise his discretion, and a jury trial does not
involve the duplication of effort and "institutional bias" against re-trying
1 no
cases present in Blackledge and Pearce .
Although a presumption of vindictiveness is not applicable, a defendant
could still establish a due process violation, if he can prove the prosecutor
actually intended to punish him:
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness, we of
course do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant in
an appropriate case might prove objectively that the pros-
ecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to
punish him for something the law plainly allowed him to
do.
107
457 U.S. at 381.
108 jd.
109
Id. at 384. Justice Blackmun saw no reason to distinguish postrial from
pretrial cases, but felt the prosecution had adequately rebutted any appearance
of vindictiveness. ld_. at 385 (Blackmun, J. concurring). Justices Brennan and
Marshall believed that a demand for a jury trial triggered Blackledge but did
not address the adequacy of the rebuttal evidence. _Id_. at 386 "(Brennan,
Marshall, J. J., dissenting).
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The most significant aspect of the decision is the Court's treatment of the
burden of persuasion after the prosecutor has upped the ante. Who has the
burden depends on when the charges against a defendant have been made more
severe. The prosecution has the burden of rebutting presumed vindictiveness
after a successful appeal. But the defendant now has the difficult burden of
proving that the prosecutor increased the severity of the charges to retaliate
against him prior to the initial trial:
As the Government states in its brief: Accordingly while
the prosecutor's charging decision is presumptively lawful
,
and the prosecutor is not required to sustain any burden of
justification for an increase in charges, the defendant is
free to tender evidence to the court to support a claim that
enhanced charges are a direct and unjustifiable penalty for
the exercise of a protected right. Of course, only in a
rare case would a defendant be able to overcome the presump-
tive validity ..of the prosecutor's actions through such a
demonstration.
Lower courts have followed Goodwin and refused to apply a presumption of
vindictiveness where the defendant demanded a jury trial and was then indicted
111
on additional charges, refused to plead guilty and was indicted on harsher
112
charges, successfully obtained dismissal of a weapons charge and was then
110
Id . at 384 n.19. (emphasis added). This footnote to the majority opinion
is not addressed in the dissenting or concurring opinions.
111
State v. Schneider, 661 P. 2d 651 (Ariz. App. 1982).
llL
United States v. Gallegos-Curiel , 681 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Currie, 667 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded 457 U.S. (1982),
aff'd on rehearing 682 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Johnson, 679




charged with an additional assault charge, or refused to waive a state grand
114
jury indictment ajid was then indicted on a more serious offense. Where a
federal prisoner successfully attacked a United States Parole Commission's
calculation of his presumptive release date, the Fourth Circuit has held that
115
the pretrial test in Goodwin applies.
But Goodwin has not been extended to require that actual vindictiveness be
shown on the part of a sentencing judge. In Longval v. Neacham , the
defendant was on trial for robbery, theft, and use of a shotgun. The trial
judge told his lawyer that if Longval did not plea bargain he might receive a
"substantial" prison sentence. The defendant refused, and was sentenced to a
forty to fifty year term. The First Circuit remanded for resentencing by a
People v. Farrow, 133 Cal . App.3d 147 (1982) (initial charge dismissed
because not brought to trial within sixty days). See CAL. PEN. C. § 1382 (West
1982).
114
Dyer v. State, 666 P. 2d 438 (Alaska App. 1983). See United States v.
Allen, 699 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1982) ( Goodwin applied when federal prosecutor
waited until conclusion of another federal trial in a different district before
indicting defendant, but no actual vindictiveness found). See also , United
States v. Hinton, 703 F.2d 672 (2d Cir.) cert, denied 454 U.S. 1090 (1983)
(defense counsel pointed out defect in government's case to the prosecutor who
added count in superseding indictment. No actual vindictiveness found). It is
still necessary that the second charges be harsher than the first. See United
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982).
115
See Fardel la v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982) (commission conceded
error after prisoner filed habeas corpus petition. Court viewed calculation of
parole date as the equivalent of pretrial decisions of a prosecutor and rejected
argument that vindictiveness should be presumed. That analysis is wrong as the
prisoner essentially appealed the parole classification. The result is correct
however, because the presumption would have been rebutted by the new evidence
made available to the commission.).
651 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1981), remanded in accordance with United State s v.
Goodwin 458 U.S. 1102 (1982), aff'd on relveaTi ng~WFT2d 236 (1st Cir. 19"8TIT~
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different judge. The Supreme Court then remanded for reconsideration in light
of their decision- in Goodwin . On reconsideration the First Circuit again did
not require the defendant to show that the judge actually increased the sentence
to punish him for exercising his rights because defense counsel would be
reluctant to make such a claim about judges they practiced before, and more
importantly because it would be an almost impossible burden. Because the facts
in that case created a reasonable likelihood that the judge acted vindictively,
117
resentencing by a different judge was again required.
But Goodwin has been improperly applied where a United States Attorney's
office, following its established policy, substituted a felony for a misdemeanor
1 1 o
because an alien rejected a plea bargain offer by the government. Goodwin is
not applicable when a defendant is plea bargaining and is aware the prosecution
will bring harsher charges if he does not plead guilty. In this situation the




693 F.2d at 238-39.
United States v. Marucio, 685 F.2d 143,144 n.l. (5th Cir.), cert, den ied
103 S. Ct. 498 (1983) misdemeanor complaint initially filed against illegal
alien. During plea negotiations prosecutor stated felony charge would be





Assume that during plea negotiations a prosecutor informs the defendant
that if his offer is not accepted, additional charges will be filed, but this
does not persuade the defendant to accept his offer. True to his word the
prosecutor then brings the additional charge. On its face, retaliation is clear
because the additional charge directly results from the exercise of a right. In
theory Blackledge should apply to prohibit filing the additional charge, but
119
this is not the case. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court held that
a prosecutor does not violate due process by threatening or bringing harsher
charges if he does so as part of plea negotiations.
Paul Lewis Hayes was initially indicted in Kentucky for uttering a forged
instrument. He had a criminal record (two prior felonies) and was subject to a
mandatory life sentence if convicted of a third felony. During plea negotia-
tions the prosecutor offered to recommend a five year prison sentence if Hayes
would plead to the charge. He told Hayes that if he did not plead, he would
1 19
434 U.S. 357, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918 (1978). See Smaltz, Due Process
Limitations on Prosecutorial Discretion in Re-charging Defendants: Pearce to
Blackledge to Bordenkircher , 36 WASH. & LEE L.REV. 347 (1979) (result in
Bordenkircher a narrow exception to due process protection against prosecutor
retal iating). My interviews with prosecutors and defense counsel were not
intended to be a survey of their opinions or to establish any statistics on how
often charges are increased by prosecutors. Most of the defense counsel I
interviewed seldom ran into vindictiveness issues with retrial cases and did not
have much more experience with pretrial increases. But this area of prosecutors
threatening to file harsher charges during plea bargaining drew a definite
response from most of them. One snapped that local district attorneys "always"
threatened to bring more severe charges during plea bargaining.
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bring the habitual offender charge. Hayes rejected the offer, the prosecutor
120
added the habitual offender charge, and Hayes received a life sentence.
I
The district court denied Hayes' petition for habeas corpus, but the Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to impose confinement based
121
solely on the forged instrument charge. Although the Sixth Circuit
recognized that plea bargaining was important to the criminal justice system, it
held that its legitimate purposes were not served by the coercion in Hayes's
case, and it applied Blackledge:
When a prosecutor obtains an indictment less severe than the
facts known to him at the time might permit, he makes a
discretionary determination that the interests of the state
are served by not seeking more serious charges. Accord-
ingly, if after plea negotiations fail, he then procures an
indictment charging a more serious crime a strong inference
is created that the only reason for the more serious charge
is vindictiveness. Under these circumstances, the prosecu-
tor should be required to justify his action. In this case,
a vindictive motive need not be inferred. The prosecutor
has admitted it.
Kentucky appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the Sixth Circuit.
The Court acknowledged the obvious: that the prosecutor's motive had been to
discourage Hayes from pleading not guilty and going to trial. But it distin-
guished plea bargaining from the rules established in Pearce and Blackledge :
120
Id. at 358-59 nn.1-3.
121





In those cases the Court was dealing with the State's
unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant "who had
chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original
conviction--a situation 'very different from the give-and-
take negotiation common in plea bargaining between the
prosecution and the defense which arguably possess
relatively equal bargaining power.' The Court has
emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as
Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant
might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, but
rather that the State might be retaliating anainst the
defendant for lawfully attacking his conviction.
As long as a defendant was free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer
there could not be impermissible retaliation in this situation, even though the
prosecutor's aim is to persuade the defendant to give up a right to plead not
124
guilty. The Court did state that even though the prosecutor has broad
discretion in this area, he was required to give notice of his intentions:
Hayes was thus fully informed of the true terms of the offer
when he made his decision to plead not guilty. This is not
a situation, therefore, where the prosecutor without notice
brought an additional and more serious charge after plea
negotiations relating to the original indictment had ended
with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty. As
a practical matter, in short, this case would be no dif-
ferent if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as a recidivist
from the outset, and the prosecutor. had offered to drop that
charge as part of the plea bargain.
123
434 U.S. at 363. It was not clear until the Goodwin decision that the
Court was primarily concerned with protecting defendants after their conviction,




Id. at 361. But see Sefchek v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. Iowa
1969)Tdefendant pled guilty to uttering a false check with a seven year maximum
sentence. After his conviction was set aside a charge of uttering a forged
instrument with a ten year maximum substituted; both charges based on the same
check. Pearce extended to prosecutor's action and conviction declared void).




Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented on the grounds that once
vindictiveness was found it did not matter whether it occurred after reversal of
126
a conviction or during plea negotiations. Justice Powell -filed a separate
dissent arguing that because a prosecutor's charging decision is normally not
reviewed, he should not be allowed to adopt "a strategy calculated solely to
deter the exercise of constitutional rights."
The majority and three dissenting justices saw practical problems with the
opposing views. The majority felt that if Blackledge were applied to plea
negotiations prosecutors would not be able to express their intentions freely
1 00
and this would "invite unhealthy subterfuge" in plea bargaining. Justices
Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall saw problems for defendants if their views were
adopted. Prosecutors would then bring all available charges from the outset,
leading to higher bail and reluctance of judges to accept negotiated pleas.
However, this result was outweighed by the benefit of requiring prosecutors to
fix the incentives from the outset, the desirability of having charging
decisions visible, and avoiding the "questionable fairness" of requiring a
(Footnote Continued)
existing or potential charges. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY,
STANDARD 3.1 (approved draft 1968). The potential charges can include "multiple
offender charges which might follow the pending conviction, and charges which
are not within the jurisdiction of the agreeing prosecutor." Ld. at 67
(commentary).
126







defendant to negotiate against a charge without knowing if the prosecutor could
actually obtain an indictment."
In Bordenkircher the defendant was directly advised of the prosecutor's
130
intention. While this may be the usual case even this is not required. If
the prosecutor's intention to bring harsher charges can reasonably be inferred
131
under the circumstances, the defendant will be considered to be on notice.
If the defendant initially accepts the bargain, pleads guilty to some of the
charges against him, but later withdraws his plea, he may properly be tried on
132
all the original charges. The prosecutor may also bring charges that he told
the defendant he intended to bring, but did not as part of the plea
129
Id. at 368 n.2. Prosecutors in England have less freedom to strike plea
bargains as English judges will insist the defendant plead to the most serious
crime shown by the evidence. See Davis, Sentences for Sale: A New Look at Plea
Bargaining in England and America , 1971 CRIM. L. REV. 221-23.
130
See , e.g., United States v. Litton Systems, Inc., 573 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.),
cert, denied 439 U.S. 828 (1978) (corporation considered to be on notice of
possible indictment if it did not agree to rehearing of claim against
government); People v. Rivera, 127 Cal . App.3d 136 (1981) (defendant shown




e.g., Ehl v. Estelle, 656 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1981) (defendant aware
habitual offender charge would be filed if he withdrew guilty plea); United
States v. Moore, 653 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1981) (threat to indict defendant and
wife reasonably implied by plea offer). But see People v. Walker, 84 111. 2d
512,419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981) (vindictiveness established when defendant not
advised of prosecutor's intention to seek death penalty if guilty plea vacated).
13?
See
, e.g., United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Gilliss, 645 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1981); Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d
133 (5th Cir.), cert, denied 429 U.S. 924 (1976); United States v. Osborne, 591
F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1978); Commonwealth v. Ward, 493 Pa. 115, 425 A. 2d 401, cert.
denied 451 U.S. 974 (1981); United States v. Herrera, 640 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.
198T7T United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982).
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The difficulty with Bordenkircher "' is that the Court upheld a prosecu-
tor's actions that it had condemned in Blackledge . The only reason Hayes faced
See United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor
agreed to file misdemeanor vice felony charge. After plea to misdemeanor set
aside felony charge could be filed); United States v. Vaughan, 565 F. 2d 283 (4th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980). Harvey v.
United States, 395 A. 2d 92 (D.C. Ct. App.) cert, denied 441 U.S. (1979). In
Harvey the court encouraged prosecutors to bring all charges from the outset.
"However, we believe the better practice is to bring all the charges in the
original indictment unless there are compelling reasons for bringing the new or
additional charges, e.g., newly discovered evidence." _Id. at 98.
134
See Chapman v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor refused to
discuss plea bargain after defendant's guilty plea set aside. Original charges
were refiled, and defense claim that actual vindictiveness present was
rejected); Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 400 U.S. 917
(1970). Contra, Mulreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970); Rivers v.
Lucas, 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), vacated as moot 414 U.S. 896 (1973); People v.
McMiller, 398 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451, cert, denied 414 U.S. 1080 (1973)
(prosecutor cannot charge more severe offense arising from same transaction
after plea vacated). One writer suggests that the potential for vindictiveness
exists when a defendant successfully appeals from an "offense" bargain and the
prosecutor must allow him to plead again to the bargained-for charge. See
B o rma n , The Chilled Right to Appeal From a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due
Process Cure
,
69 N.W.U.L. REV. 663, 694-95 (1975T
135
Bordenkircher has been criticized by a number of writers. See Abrams,
Systematic Coercion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the Criminal Law , 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128 (1981) (criticizes decision for failing to apply the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine); Rubin, The Resurrection of the
Right-Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look at Maher v. Roe and Bordenkircher
v. Hayes , 7 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 165, 197 (1980) (decision abandons concept of
preventative deterrence); Comment, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and Plea
Bargaining: What are the Limits? , 27 ~DE PAUL L. REV. 124T71977) (criticizes
decision for view of facts in the case); Comment, Bordenkircher v. Hayes
,
2 CRIM. JUSTICE J. 401 (1979) (notes Kentucky changed recidivist statute after
Hayes' conviction and Hayes would receive ten to twelve years under new
statute); Note, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Discretion and




(and received) a life sentence was because he refused to "save the court the
inconvenience and necessity of a trial." The prosecutor had a stake in
discouraging not guilty pleas, and the means to discourage them: withholding an
habitual offender charge carrying a mandatory life sentence. In contrast to the
situation in Blackledge
,
the prosecutor also admitted the reason the habitual
offender charge was added was because Hayes insisted on pleading not guilty.
The issue was not whether a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness should
control, but whether actual vindictiveness was present.
The Court upheld the prosecutor's actions on the grounds that Hayes was on
notice of his intentions: "But in the 'give and take' of plea bargaining, there
is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the defendant is free
137
to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Of course Hayes was punished
no less because the prosecution told him what would happen if he insisted on
pleading not guilty. The fact that he was on notice did not change the fact he
(Footnote Continued)
the Supreme Court improperly relied on the safeguards necessary for a knowing
and intelligent guilty plea instead of safeguards against prosecutorial
vindictiveness). But see Pizzi, Prosecutorial Discretion, Plea Bargaining and
the Supreme Court's Decision in Bordenkircher v. Hayes
,
8 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 269
TT979) (dissent position unworkable); Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedie s
for Broken Plea Bargains
,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 487 n.66 (1978) (decision
affirms protection against vindictiveness, but facts did not establish improper
motivation. This interpretation is at odds with the author's analysis of a
similar fact pattern at 486-87); McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in
Determining Guilt
,
32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 915 (1980) (decision recognizes that
plea bargaining is adequate procedure for determining guilt).
lj6
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 358.
137
434 U.S. at 363.
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was punished, but it made filing the habitual offender charge acceptable to the
Court.
If notice, and an opportunity to make an informed, albeit difficult, choice
were the primary reason for the result in Bordenkircher , the case makes good
sense. The defendant is willing to bargain away his right to plead not guilty.
A threat to bring harsher charges is a bargaining chip for the prosecutor, as is
the defendant's threat to force the prosecutor to run the risk and effort at a
contested trial. Also, even though threatened charges do not violate a
defendant's due process right, the prosecution does not have unlimited freedom.
He is still expected to have probable cause to support the threatened charge,
selection of the charge must not be based on an "unjustifiable standard such as




But the primary basis for the Court's decision in Bordenkircher is its
belief that the freedom to threaten additional charges is necessary to the
100
A defendant may allege that the statute he is charged with violating has
not been enforced, and is being used against him because of his race or exercise
of first amendment rights. He has the burden of proving both those facts,
however. See United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1896); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972); Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview , 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 383
(1976) (describes majority view that prosecutor's discretion is immune from
judicial review and selective prosecution cases difficult to prove).
139
The grounds for withdrawing guilty pleas is beyond the scope of this paper.
For a discussion of withdrawing guilty pleas under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d), see
Annot., 9 A.L.R. FED. 707 (1979) (discussing effect of judge failing to advise
defendant of special parole term for narcotic offenses); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255




survival of the practice of plea bargaining, and that if this freedom were
restricted by the courts, the collateral results would be detrimental to
defendants as a group. But I question the idea that the institution of plea
bargaining cannot survive if prosecutors were expected to bring charges, such as
an habitual offender allegation, from the outset. ' There may be sound reasons
for not doing so, but if there are, they do not disappear when a defendant
desires to plead not guilty. A defendant's right to plead not guilty and have a
trial on the original charges should be given more weight than the administra-
tive inconvenience involved in filing the most serious charges from the outset.
140
Michigan requires that habitual offender allegations be filed before plea
negotiations are conducted. People v. Fountain, 407 Mich. 96, 282 N.W.2d 168
(1979); People v. Martin, 100 Mich. App. 447, 298 N.W.2d 900 (1980) (threat of
habitual offender charge "always creates appearance of coercion). See also
PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION at 18 (charging every offense may be perceived
as an "unfair attempt to induce a guilty plea"); NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
9.4 (Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1979) ("The prosecutor shall not attempt to
utilize the charging decision only as a leverage device in obtaining guilty
pleas to lesser charges.").
141
In Goodwin the Court noted that if it had condemned the threat of adding
charges, that "an equally compelling argument could be made that a prosecutor's
initial charging decision could never be influenced by what he hoped to gain in
the course of plea negotiation." 457 U.S. at 379, n.10 (emphasis added). This
analysis is inapplicable, because the first charging decision would not follow
the exercise of a right, therefore no issue of retaliation is even raised.
Viewing the initial charging decision as somehow involving "additional" charges,
the Court said: "If such use of 'additional' charges were presumptively
invalid, the institution of plea negotiation could not survive." J_d.
142
In the same footnote the Court recognized that had Bordenkircher been
decided differently, prosecutors would be motivated to bring the most severe
charges from the outset. This would then, in the Court's view, lead to
defendants having to plea bargain against harsher charges, facing higher bails
and reluctance of judges to accept negotiated please, ^d. But a defendant does
bargain against harsher charges under their ruling in Bordenkircher . Also, if a
prosecutor desires to allow a defendant to face lesser bail, that motivation
should not change just because a plea of not guilty is entered. And charging
lesser offenses, but plea bargaining against greater, involves the same sort of
"subterfuge" the Court desired to avoid in Bordenkircher.
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The Court's rationale for Bordenkircher leads to the situation that a person
charged with an -offense cannot pursue his constitutional rights at a trial
without apprehension that the prosecutor will retaliate, because it would
somehow be detrimental to the administration of justice for him to be charged
with the full extent of his criminal activities from the outset. This elevates
the potential burden on prosecutors too high, assumes too much, and is an
insufficient rationale for not safeguarding a defendant's right to be free from
vindictive charging decisions.
If the prosecutor does not inform the defendant that he will add charges if
his offer is not accepted, the defendant will have the burden of proving that
the additional charges stem from actual vindictiveness, because they will have
been brought prior to trial. The holding in Bordenkircher that actual
vindictiveness is never present when the ante is upped following unsuccessful
plea negotiations does not apply, because the defendant was not told of the
prosecutor's intention. The fact that the increase followed unsuccessful plea
negotiations should be considered with all the evidence in the case to determine
if actual vindictiveness has been established.
If the defendant accepts the offer, pleads guilty, but later successfully
withdraws his plea, may the prosecutor then file harsher charges that were not
discussed during the earlier plea negotiations? If justified by new evidence
143
any appearance of vindictiveness is of course overcome. Prior to





Bordenkircher three courts found vindictiveness in that situation, and one
state court has -held that Bordenkircher does not permit adding an habitual
145
offender allegation after a guilty plea is set aside. If the prosecutor does
not disclose his intention to file additional charges, the question after
Goodwin is whether actual or presumed vindictiveness is the test. Even though
the guilty plea was set aside, a defendant has been tried, found guilty and may
have served part of his sentence. While the defendant may be returned to his
original position, the prosecution has not been content with that, but has
chosen to up the ante. The argument is that the "institutional bias" against
retrying a settled question and the interest in insuring guilty pleas are
voluntarily and intelligently made support applying a presumption of vindictive-
ness. However, the defendant has not fully complied with his part of the plea
bargain. The prosecution argument is that both sides are returned to the plea
bargaining stage and therefore the defendant must prove actual vindictiveness.
(Footnote Continued)
threatening federal judge, the defendant sent two more threatening letters to
the judge. Adding post-indictment counts after his plea was withdrawn not
vindictive).
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Sefcheck v. Brewer, supra note 125; United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170
(4th Cir. 1976) (defendant's pleas to two counts of four-count indictment
vacated; prosecution brought forty-two count indictment based on facts known
from the outset. Additional counts set aside for vindictiveness, but defendant
could be tried on the original indictment); State v. Boudreaux, 402 So. 2d 629
(La. 1981).
145
See People v. Ivery, 615 P. 2d 80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980) (after guilty plea
accepted, conviction considered final under state law. Prosecutor not permitted
to file additional habitual offender allegation at retrial); Borman, The Chilled
Right to Appeal from a Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure , 69 N.W.U.
L. REV. 663, 693 (1975); Note, "Upping the Ante" Against the Defendant Who
Successfully Attacks His Guilty Plea: Double Jeopardy and Due Process
Implications
, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 857 (1975) (if harsher charge brought after
plea withdrawn appearance of vindictiveness is raised).
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The added charge was known to the prosecution before plea negotiations, was
not formally field, and the defendant was not told that he could face that
charge during negotiations. The interest the prosecution is seeking to protect
is not to return to the original starting point, but rather the freedom to
withhold a charge to be used after a conviction is set aside. Also, the Supreme
Court's concern with hurting the practice of plea bargaining is not applicable.
The pressure on the prosecutor is not to add all known charges from the outset,
but simply to notify the defendant of his intentions, an action the Court
approved of in Bordenkircher . When the prosecutor ups the ante by adding a
known charge after a plea bargained connection is set aside, and has not
disclosed that potential charge during the plea negotiations, the defendant
should be entitled to a presumption that the added charge is vindictively
motivated.
IV. Mistrials
Goodwin establishes completion of the first trial as the point where the
burden of persuasion changes. Once the ante has been upped, the prosecution
must rebut presumed vindictiveness after trial, while the defendant must prove
actual retaliation prior to trial. Which of these standards should apply when
harsher charges are brought after the defendant successfully obtains a mistrial?
50

Prior to Goodwin the courts generally held that if the ante was upped after
A 146
a mistrial a defendant could prevail by showing apparent vindictiveness.
However, the defendant must have moved for the mistrial to, establish that a
147
right had been exercised. Also, if the harsher charges arose from separate
148
incidents, any appearance of vindictiveness could be rebutted.
One assumption made by the Court in the Goodwin decision is that at some
point the prosecution is expected to have investigated and made a considered
decision about which charges are appropriate in a case. That point is clearly
at the end of the first trial if the defendant is convicted, but it should also
include the start of a trial. A mistrial involves duplication of effort to
resolve a case. The prosecutor has done his pretrial preparation, devoted time
and possibly government funds to put on the trial, only to be faced with the
necessity of repeating all his efforts to obtain a conviction. In fact, it is
I4fi
See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974)
(defendant originally charged with second degree murder, and motion for mistrial
granted. Then indicted for first degree murder); Curry v. State, 281 S.E.2d 604
(Ga. 1981) (after mistrial additional charges based on same incident filed);
United states v. D'Alo, 486 F. Supp. 954 (D. R.I. 1980) (after mistrial
defendant charged with different offenses that did not raise maximum sentence.
However charges were dismissed because government had improved chance of
conviction by revising charges. This case has not been followed by other
courts); Johnson v. State, 396 A. 2d 163 (Del. 1978) (murder charge with
mandatory life sentence brought after mistrial); United States v. Motley, 655
F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1981) (superceding indictment brought after mistrial exposed
defendant to additional ten years confinement). Contra
, United States v.
Ruppel , 666 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1982) (mistrial resulting from hung jury does not
raise presumption of vindictiveness).
147
United States v. Thurnhuber, 572 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1977).
14R
United States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 425
U.S. 953 (1976); United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1978).
51

more likely that a prosecutor would retaliate while the "loss" is fresh in his
mind than years later when a conviction is reversed on appeal.
Choosing the start of the trial as the point where the burden shifts has
the benefit of establishing the stakes at the outset. This places a premium on
151
thorough preparation by the prosecution, but the people should expect no less
from their prosecutors and the practical problems that exist are not so great
that the start of trial is an unreasonable point to hold the prosecution to
their charges.
The Supreme Court of California and one California appellate court have
also held that Goodwin allows a presumption of vindictiveness when the ante is
152
upped after a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Indiana has gone further,
149
"[T]he likelihood of vindictiveness after mistrials is significant, so
prosecutors should be required to justify any subsequent increase in charges."
81 MICH L. REV. at 214 n.99.
150
This is unlike the situation where the remote possibility that a conviction
will be reversed has little or no influence on charging decisions. _Id. at 219.
151
I discussed this issue with an Assistant United States Attorney from San
Diego, an Assistant District Attorney from San Diego, and a senior deputy
District Attorney from Cook County, Illinois. Both San Diego prosecutors said
their offices encounter lengthy delays in receiving criminal records. The
deputy from Cook County, however, said his office receives information on
defendants within a few days. All three said their office organization led to
case files starting with inexperienced attorneys, moving to a more experienced
attorney as the case got closer to trial. The San Diego deputy also pointed out
than even when a case is close to trial, many cases were negotiated out at this
stage. This led to cases not being fully prepared until shortly before the
actual trial date, to avoid a waste of effort.
152
Twiggs v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.3d 360, 194 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1983) (five




holding that the prosecution is barred from showing a lack of vindictive
153
motivation after harsher charges are filed after a mistrial.
Presuming vindictiveness when harsher charges are brought after a mistrial
is declared at the defendant's request is consistent with the Supreme Court's
analysis in Goodwin , lower court decisions prior to and subsequent to that
decision, and provides a reasonable protection against the likelihood that the
prosecutor has acted vindictively. The prosecutor still has the opportunity to
change the charges up to the time of trial without risk he will have to justify
any increase, and still has the opportunity to show objective and non-vindictive
154
reasons for increasing the severity of the charges.
(Footnote Continued)
Superior Court, 149 Cal. App.3d 30, 196 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1983) (felony
substituted for misdemeanor).
Murphy v. State, 453 N.E.2d 219 (Ind. 1983) (the day following a mistrial
the prosecutor filed an habitual offender count which raised the maximum
sentence from twelve to forty years. The court held:
Under such circumstances, fundamental fairness precludes a
requirement that Defendant show vindictive motivation or
that the State be permitted to show its absence . Were we to
hold otherwise, an accused in Defendant's predicament would
be required to elect whether he would submit to a trial had
without due process of law or a trial wherein there was a
potential for a much more severe penalty. Our concept of
justice simply will not sanction an implicit form of
bargaining where the accused must purchase due process of
law. kL at 227 (emphasis added).
154
After defendant successfully moves for a mistrial double jeopardy does not
bar his retrial for the same offense unless "the conduct giving rise to the
successful motion for a mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial conduct intended
to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial." Oregon v. Kennedy, 456
U.S. 667 (1982) (emphasis in the original).
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VI. Criticism of Goodwin
There is a clear flaw in the Fourth Circuit's decision in Goodwin's
155
case. That court's mistake was in not giving sufficient weight to the
evidence that justified the second prosecutor obtaining the felony indictment.
Although the substituted felony charge followed two occasions when misdemeanors
were filed, it also followed a more extensive inquiry into Goodwin's criminal
156background than had been done by the first prosecutors. When the Fourth
Circuit held the prosecutor to knowledge of all facts available to the
government but not actually known, it essentially treated the appearance of
vindictiveness standard as a conclusive presumption. Neither the Supreme Court
nor any lower court has held that apparent vindictiveness could not be
157
rebutted, nor that prosecutors were held to know all "available" information.
The Supreme Court could easily have ruled that a rebuttable presumption of
vindictiveness was raised, but that it was overcome by the discovery of evidence
about Goodwin's criminal record. 158
155
United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir 1981)
156 „.„_,.
misdemeanors. Id. at 252 The Assistant iiT,4Lh ct * ,17 petty offens es and
indicant als^ coortlniteJ^Sffis r r "r " ClS "to 'ZtU'fVirginia was obligated to return him In rl\iJZ V1r9 lnia , Maryland.




Goodwin to California after thfdfstrttrnu.tt i Attorne\ a9^ed to return
of Assistant United St.^^
Contra Murphy v. State, supra note 153
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Whenever a prosecutor ups the ante he is exercising his discretion for the
second time, in -effect, changing his mind about the case. The discretion
involved is not the traditional freedom given a prosecutor to. bring charges or
not, but the discretion to increase the risk to the defendant. Another problem
with the Goodwin decision is that the Court gave more weight to this discretion
159
than to the defendant's right to a jury trial. That trial by jury fared
badly against a prosecutor's change of mind is extraordinary when compared with
the protection afforded a convicted defendant who appeals a conviction. The
Constitution does not require that an appeal be afforded to a criminal
defendant, yet the effect of Goodwin is that a statutory appeal right is
given more protection from vindictiveness than the constitutional right to a
(Footnote Continued)
Assistant United States Attorney Mr. Edward M. Norton, Jr., supra note 49. One
factor that justified the felony charge was the similarity between the Virginia
incident and the one at trial. In both, Goodwin violently resisted apprehension
for drug possession (proven in the Virginia case and inferred in the federal
case). This knowledge of Goodwin's apparent habit of assaulting arresting
officers is both objective and a reasonable basis for taking a harsher view of
the incident.
159
Professor Davis' criticism of a prosecutor's unreviewed discretion focuses
on the initial decision of whether to charge or not. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 209-13 (1976). See also Recent Develop-
ments-Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
,
supra note 34 (suggesting that the
government must show compelling justification for increased charges that follow
exercise of fundamental right); In re Lewallen, 23 Cal.3d 274,282, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 528,532 (1979) (sentencing judge may not "chill exercise of jury right by
imposing a more severe sentence . . . ."). English prosecutors may add more
serious charges after a defendant demands a jury trial if the evidence
supporting those charges was taken in his presence. R. v. Nesbit, [1971] 3 ALL
E.R. 307 "(Crim. App.); R. v. Roe, [1967] 1 ALL E.R. (Crim. App.); Queen v.
Brown, [1895] 1 Q.B. 119; 11 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, para. 119 (1976).
Contra , R. v. Phillips, 1 ALL E.R. 896 (Crim. App.) ("something in the nature of
a trap" to allow increased charges after jury trial demanded).
The Court recognized that states were not bound to establish an opportunity
to appeal convictions in Blackledge . 417 U.S. at 26 n.4.
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jury trial. Of the two it would be appropriate to protect jury trial demands
with a standard at least as favorable as that applied in appeals, if not one
more favorable. i
It was also unnecessary for the Court to imply that in all pretrial cases a
presumption of vindictiveness is never appropriate. Even if it is reasonable to
place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to show vindictive motivation,
the practical problems of preparing the prosecutor's case do not support the
Court's implied holding that his motives are never vindictive. The footnote in
Goodwin to the effect that a prosecutor is presumed not to act from vindictive
motives, and only a rare case should be decided for the defendant goes much too
far, and places an unjustified burden on a defendant facing harsher charges. A
rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness test provides a reasonable approach for
resolving allegations of vindictiveness if facts supporting the prosecutor, such
as the lack of knowledge about Goodwin's other criminal activities, are given
full weight. 161
161
This approach would not have contradicted Bordenkircher , for unlike the
facts in that case no mention of a felony charge was made during the plea
negotiations between Goodwin's counsel and the Assistant U. S. Attorney. 457
U.S. at 371. In fact, without this crucial fact of notice, Bordenkircher
arguably calls for applying a presumption of vindictiveness. See Id . at 385
(Blackmun, J. concurring), 387 (Brennan, Marshall, J. J. dissenting); Note,
Fifth Amendment - Prosecutor Not Presumed Vindictive in Pretrial Charge
Increases After Defendant's Request for a Jury Trial , 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1452 (1983); Note, United States v. Goodwin, Enhanced Discretion in
the Pretrial Setting , 10 OHIO NORTHERN U. U. REV. 415 (1983); Comment,
Unleashing the Prosecutor's Discretion , 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 506 (1983) ( Goodwin
decision should be limited to its facts, and the Supreme Court has sanctioned
abuse of the prosecutor's discretion).
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VII. Factors for resolving vindictive prosecution claims
Even though the Court has shown that it does not consider presumed
vindictiveness a proper standard in pretrial cases, it is not clear that it
meant that an absence of vindictiveness will be presumed in every case under any
set of facts. Such a reading of Goodwin is inconsistent with their statements
that due process protects a defendant against retaliation. But it is clear that
in a pretrial case the defendant has the burden of proving that the prosecutor
retaliated against him. This places the issue primarily with trial judges, who
must balance the competing interests of prosecutors and defendants while
weighing the evidence presented.
If a prosecutor has to go through a contested trial to convict a defendant
he may well want to make it worth his while. This does not mean he will bring
I CO
unfounded charges but he will be motivated to find as many charges as
possible or to decide that a misdemeanor case now warrants a felony charge.
Pressure to keep up with a case load leads prosecutors to a guilty plea. But
I CO
"The prosecutor shall file only those charges which he believes can
reasonably be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial." NATIONAL
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 9.4 (Nat'l Dist. Atty. Assn. 1979); PRINCIPLES
OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION at 5-6. See F. R. Crim. P. 29(a) (A) (judgment of
acquittal may be entered if evidence considered insufficient to sustain a con-
viction). See also
,
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining
,
36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 50,89 (1969) (prosecutors motivated by calendar considerations to
move cases and view drafting charges as a technical exercise to gain leverage,
not as an equitable task); Thomas, Prosecutorial Decision Making
,
13 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 507 (1976) (lists factors used in decision to charge).
-ICO
"[T]he entire criminal justice system comes to depend upon a high rate of
guilty pleas.




fairness to the same defendant should require that at some point his exposure to
prison is clearly established. Unlimited freedom to increase the severity of
charges against a defendant can lead to unfair coercion by prosecutors. Trial
164judges have a responsibility to curb such unfair charging decisions. All of
these interests now meet at the trial level because judges must decide if the
prosecutor increased the severity of the charges to retaliate against a
defendant for successfully exercising a procedural or constitutional right.
To do this, they will evaluate the circumstantial evidence surrounding any
pretrial increase in the charges, much as trial courts consider circumstantial
165
evidence on other issues. As the issue is only raised if the ante has been
upped after exercise of a procedural right, those two facts alone may not be
(Footnote Continued)
and correctional facilities built in anticipation of these practices." NEWMAN,
CONVICTIONS, THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 2 (1966).
The San Diego United States Attorney's office has a practice of filing a felony
and a misdemeanor charge against illegal aliens. It is understood that if the
alien pleads guilty to the misdemeanor the felony will be dropped.
"[J]udges in practice, commonly assume a responsibility for the functioning
of the over-all criminal justice system, rather than limiting their activities
to the direct, immediate business of the court." Id. at 36. This has led to
their acquitting guilty defendants when they believe police methods have been
unfair. JkL at 235-36.
165
The actual vindictiveness test is similar to the one applied when a
defendant alleges that double jeopardy bars reprosecution after he requested a
mistrial: that the prosecutor intended to provoke him into moving for a
mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, supra note 154. The majority in Kennedy believed
that trial courts could apply that standard: "[A] standard that examines the
intent of the prosecutor, though certainly not entirely free from practical
difficulties, is a manageable standard to apply. It merely calls for the court
to make a finding of fact. Inferring the existence or nonexistence from
objective facts and circumstances is a familiar process in our criminal justice
system." j_d. at 675. Justice Powell emphasized that trial courts "should rely




sufficient by themselves to prove actual retaliation. A prosecutor may be
tempted not to present any evidence, and rest on the argument that the
defendant has not met his burden. But the circumstances surrounding filing the
harsher charges could persuade an individual judge that the prosecution intended
to retaliate. Without any justification offered by the prosecution the trial
judge may decide for the defendant, and his decision will stand unless clearly
1 cc
wrong. Even though the burden is on the defendant, prosecutors will be
pressured to present evidence to show a lack of retaliatory intent, much as they
must do in retrial cases. I suggest that the following factors are pertinent in
analyzing vindictive prosecution claims. I do not suggest that these factors
i f\f\
A trial judge's finding of fact is generally upheld on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert, denied 429 U.S. 1120 (1977); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Conner, 478 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1973). See, 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2573 at 686-89. However, judges
have rarely interfered with a prosecutor's exercise of discretion. See also
,
Vorenburg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power , 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1540-42 (198iy:
These factors can also be useful to determine whether a defendant will be
entitled to a hearing on his motion to dismiss or be entitled to discovery of
government documents that bear on the decision to increase the charges. The
approach should be similar to that taken where the defendant alleges selective
prosecution and bears the burden of proving that others similarly situated have
not been prosecuted and that he was selected for prosecution because of his
race, religion, or his exercise of constitutional rights. To obtain a hearing
the defendant must put forward "some evidence tending to show the existence of
the essential elements of the (selective prosecution) defense," and to obtain
discovery also show "that the documents in the government's possession would
indeed be probative of these elements." United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d
1207, 1211-12 (2nd Cir. 1974). While a showing that harsher charges followed
exercise of a right may not be sufficient of itself to prove vindictiveness, it
does make out a prima facie case which could entitle the defendant to a hearing
and a possible discovery of documents. But see United States v. Rodriguez, 429
F. Supp. 520, 522 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (Assistant U.S. Attorneys should only be
required to testify on vindictive prosecution issues in "extraordinary
circumstances" and their files are normally immune from discovery).
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are constitutionally required. But they are objective and bear the relevant
issue of a prosecutor's motivation for bringing harsher charges.
A. Nature of the harsher charges Has the sentence been increased by
substituting a harsher version of the original charges, have unrelated crimes
been substituted, or has the defendant now been charged as an habitual offender?
If a harsher version has been substituted it is more likely that the increase
was vindictively motivated. If charges were added but arise from the same
transaction that let to the original charge, the added charges should be
considered to be a harsher version of the original charges. If charges from
separate incidents have been added it is inappropriate to dismiss them on
vindictive prosecution grounds. Because a defendant is on trial for one
incident does not mean he has a due process right to be charged at that time
with all known charges. Adding an habitual offender allegation that was
available prior to the first charging decision indicates vindictiveness.
B. Information known to the prosecutor . Did the prosecutor base the
increase on new information learned after the first charges were filed? If so,
vindictiveness is clearly not indicated. The real issue here is what informa-
tion will the prosecutor be considered to know. Are all United States
Attorney's offices charged with notice of information held by other offices, and
with notice of all information held by law enforcement agencies? Because the
motivation of the prosecutor who increased the severity of the charges is the
key, actual knowledge should be required, and not an artificial assumption that
the prosecutor knows information held by other agencies.
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If the prosecutor who brought the original charge did not know of
information held by his office that supports the harsher charges, it is not
consistent with an actual vindictiveness test to hold him to .knowledge of that
information. If he later finds out about that information it is new to him and
indicates a back of vindictiveness. In practice, this point will be raised by
the prosecution. Without any attempt to show new information, the court should
proceed on the premise that the information supporting any increase in charges
was available when the initial charges were brought.
C. Time and timing . If harsher charges are filed immediately after a
defendant successfully exercises a pretrial right, retaliation is more likely.
This fact also indicates that the prosecution had the information supporting the
harsher charge prior to the defendant exercising the right. A variation on the
time harsher charges are filed is the length of time the prosecution has had the
case since charges were first filed. If a substantial period of time has
elapsed, it is more likely that the prosecution has had sufficient time to
evaluate the available information. The longer the first charges remained
unchanged before exercise of the right, the more credible is the conclusion that
a later increase is not due to closer evaluation, but is due to retaliation.
If the increase follows unsuccessful plea negotiations, and the defendant
was not told that he would face the harsher charges during negotiations,
vindictiveness is more likely. While Bordenkircher would control had the
defendant been given notice, it does not (and should not) insulate the
prosecutor from examination of his motives when notice is not given.
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D. Effect of the defendant's exercise of a right . The more difficult the
defendant has made the case for the prosecutor, the more" likely he would
retaliate against the defendant. For instance, a cross-country shift in a trial
is more of a burden on a prosecutor's office than a short continuance. The hard
issue here is how to treat a demand for a jury trial. The majority in Goodwin
did not think jury trials put much of a strain on prosecutors, and they are
probably correct on that point. But the forum, judge or jury, is only one part
of a contested case. What is important is that when the defendant contests the
case he increases the burden on the prosecutor by forcing him to run the risk of
a trial and increases the burden still further by demanding a jury trial.
Demand for a jury trial is of some weight and should be considered with other
evidence that the prosecution had to devote extra effort in prosecuting the
case, such as bringing in witnesses from long distance for the trial.
E. Procedures and policies in the prosecutor's office . In many cases the
defendant's case file may start with an inexperienced prosecutor at the
preliminary stage of a case and move to a more experienced trial attorney as the
case gets closer to trial. Should the fact that a subsequent prosecutor on the
case decided to increase the severity of the charges go toward showing a lack of
vindictiveness? A subsequent prosecutor will probably have his own view on
which charges to bring, and should have the independence to reassess the case
against the defendant. But he will also be affected by the institutional
pressure to discourage defendants from aggressively attacking the government's
See Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra note 74 (vindictiveness could be rebutted
by showing "a different approach ... by a successor prosecutor").
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case. The fact that it was a new prosecutor who upped the ante by itself should
not negate any inference of vindictiveness.
:
i
What if the subsequent prosecutor says that the prosecutor who brought the
first charges made a mistake, and he brought the harsher charges to correct that
169
error? If an oversight is the reason lesser charges were brought initially,
fairness to a defendant should not require that the prosecutor lose valid
charges simply for that reason. On the other hand, while this fact shows a lack
of intent to retaliate, a court should be reluctant to accept at face value a
claim of mistake. A clear showing that an oversight occurred should be
required. For instance, if the defendant is only charged with assault instead
of homicide when the victim's death is known from the cutset, the less
persuasive the claim that homicide was not charged because the first prosecutor
made a mistake.
If the prosecutor's office has a policy of filing the most serious charges
from the outset, but in this case did not follow that policy, the inference of
retaliation is stronger. The courts are not in the business of requiring
169
The courts have split on whether mistake is a valid justification for
increasing the charges. The Fifth Circuit would accept mistake. JkL The Ninth
Circuit and Sixth Circuit would not. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 543 F.2d
1367, 1730 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 456 (6th
Cir. 1980) (but inexperience could be considered to rebut vindictiveness).
"Except as hereinafter provided, the attorney for the government should
charge, or should recommend that the grand jury charge, the most serious offense
that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and that is
likely to result in a sustainable conviction." PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL




prosecutors to adhere to their own office policies, but the fact that they were
not followed in a particular case is an important consideration in deciding
whether the prosecutor retaliated or not. An objection to this view that can be
raised is that prosecutors would be reluctant to establish policies to avoid
having them used against them. But policies are established for reasons other
than concern about the effect a failure to follow them might have on a
particular case. Also, not following such a policy is only one factor a court
should consider, and I do not suggest defendants should be given any right to
compel enforcement of office policy.
G. Statements by the prosecutor . If the prosecutor said anything that
connects the harsher charges with the defendant's exercise of a right,
retaliation is indicated. For instance a threat to seek a felony indictment if
a case is not promptly tried indicates that the harsher charges were brought to
retaliate after a continuance request. The issue is the intent or motivation of
the prosecutor, and his statements are obviously important in determining why
the severity of the charges were increased.
The advantage in examining these factors is that they are relevant to the
issue of whether an actual motive to retaliate led to the increased charges, and
they are reasonably objective enough for a court to use. They allow defense
counsel a reasonable opportunity to show vindictiveness which should prevent a
perception that prosecutors can act vindictively prior to trial. At the same
time, the defense must carry the burden and prosecutors are entitled to show
factors that negate an inference of vindictiveness. Successful motions will be
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based on a factual conclusion, rather than an artificial presumption that does
not adequately address the facts in an individual case.
At the same time these factors are not without weaknesses. While they are
reasonably objective they do not lead to a particular conclusion by themselves.
They must be weighed by individual judges who may be influenced by their own
experiences and views. The necessity that a judge draw conclusions from these
factors will lead to different results in cases raising very similar facts.
Without a definite standard prosecutors will not know what actions to avoid, and
defense counsel will not know which case merits an attack and which does not.
For example, while the way in which the charges were increased will be
clear, the judge must still decide how one type of increase indicates retal-
iation more than another. Substituting a felony for a misdemeanor which
increases the sentence from one year to five years may be considered more
indicative than when an additional felony charge was added that increased the
maximum from five years to ten. In the first case the potential sentence was
increased five-fold, versus doubling the maximum in the second. But the actual
increase was only four years in the first case, and was five years in the
second.
Information known to the prosecutor also mixes objective facts and
subjective analysis. A judge may agree that the information was in fact new,
and that the prosecutor was justifiably unaware of the information. But he may
not agree that the information provides a reasonable basis for the increase.
For example, he may accept that the prosecution discovered a previous
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misdemeanor conviction, but may not be impressed if the defendant was initially
charged with a series of felonies.
:
i
Judges will have to decide whether the timing of the increase indicates
retaliation. Does an increase one day after a successful suppression motion
show vindictiveness more clearly than an increase one week later? Probably, but
what about an increase two weeks after the motion, or one month?
Judges may differ in their perception of the difficulty caused by the
exercise of a right. The Supreme Court was not unanimous on the burden caused
by a jury trial, and trial judges will have different views on whether a jury
trial demand indicates vindictiveness more than exercise of other rights.
The same problem exists when a prosecutor's office procedures are raised.
Judges will be evaluating the reasonableness of a new charging decision by a
successor prosecutor and the reasonableness of any claim of a mistake in the
first decision. An additional problem is raised with any policy regarding the
first charges. This creates pressure on prosecutors not to have a policy of
bringing the most serious charges from the outset. But a particular judge may
believe such a policy is the better practice and that the absence of that policy
makes increases more, not less, suspect. This puts prosecutors who want to
establish a policy in a quandary.
Evaluating any statements made by a prosecutor places him in a dilemma. If
he tells the defendant that an increase is possible, his words may be used
against him, even if he considered that fairness called for him to be candid.
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But if he says nothing, his silence about a known and contemplated increase
still can allow the inference of retaliation. It is very hard for a prosecutor
to walk this line, and equally hard for a judge to interpret the meaning behind
his words. For instance, if a prosecutor said to a defendant's counsel, "Look,
I have to tell you that another robbery charge might be brought if we have to go
to trial on this," isn't he connecting the increase with exercise of a right as
much as if he had said "If you insist on a trial we will file on this other
robbery"?
The problems and weaknesses with deciding vindictive prosecution issues on
the actual motivation of the prosecutor that I have described are not caused by
the factors I have suggested. They are an inevitable result of the actual
vindictiveness test. The potential for disparate results in similar cases,
exposure of prosecution files to discovery, lack of precise guidelines, and
evaluation by judges of the reasonableness of prosecutors' decisions is caused
by this standard, not by the objective factors that should be used.
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VIII. Comparison of the results in United States v. DeMarco
171 :
A. The DeMarco decision . In 1975 Mr. DeMarco was facing charges in
Washington D.C. arising from the preparation of President Nixon's 1969 income
172
tax return. He successfully obtained a change of venue to California. The
prosecutors opposed the change of venue and informed DeMarco' s lawyers that if
venue was transferred, an additional charge would be filed by the California
office. After the change of venue the United States Attorney's office in
173
California filed the additional charge. At trial, the district court
dismissed the additional charge as vindictively motivated, relying in part on a
174
presumption of vindictiveness raised by the above facts, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.
171
United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 434 U.S.
827 (1977).
172
DeMarco was charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States, making
false statements to the IRS in Washington D.C, and obstructing justice. His
co-defendant also moved to change venue to Chicago. 16. at 1226.
173
The added charge alleged false statements made to an IRS agent in
California in 1974. Jd.
174
United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505 (CD. Cal. 1975). There were
two grounds for the district court's dismissal of the California charge. The
first was that both Blackledge and a court's inherent supervisory authority over
the administration of justice prohibited threats designed to deter exercise of a
right. I_d. at 512. The second was that the prosecution did not disclose to the
grand jury that an attack on that charge could be made, which denied the grand
jury material information. J_d. at 513. The Ninth Circuit did not address this
second reason for dismissing the California charge. 550 F.2d at 1275.
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B. The decision under Goodwin . As a pretrial right to a change of venue
was exercised, DeMarco would have the burden of proving an actual intent to
retaliate. If the Supreme Court's footnote in Goodwin is to, be taken at face
value he must also overcome the presumption that the prosecutor did not intend
to retaliate. Even considering the threats made by the prosecutors, if this
presumption really exists, DeMarco could fail to meet that additional burden.
This result is unsatisfactory because the connection between the additional
charge and the venue change is clear, and reliance on an artificial presumption
does not allow full examination of all the facts in the case.
C. DeMarco analyzed under the suggested factors .
1. Nature of the harsher charges. The maximum sentence was increased by
adding a separate charge based on acts committed in California. This was not a
case where a harsher variation of the original charges was filed, which negates
vindictiveness.
2. Information known to the prosecutor. Although the California charge
was from a separate transaction, the facts surrounding that charge were known to
the first prosecutors prior to the transfer of the case. As the charge was not
based on new information, vindictiveness is indicated.
3. Time and timing. The timing does not show or disprove vindictiveness.
The additional charge would not have been brought until the case was transferred
to California. But as an indictment was obtained from a grand jury and the
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Washington D.C. prosecutors knew of the California incident, there was no new
review of the facts, which indicates vindictiveness.
i
4. Effect of the venue change. The case was transferred from one side of
the country to another for trial. This must have had a major impact on the
prosecution, which indicates the California charge was brought to retaliate.
5. Policy of the United States Attorney's office. The California office
did not bring the additional charge from the outset because of a policy against
simultaneous prosecutions. Once the case was transferred, that policy no longer
applied. Such an approach is beneficial to a defendant, removing the strain and
expense of defending himself against multiple prosecutions in different parts of
the country, and tends to negate vindictiveness.
6. Statements by the prosecutor. This is the key fact in the case. The
Washington D.C. prosecutor warned the defendant that he would face harsher
175
charges if he changed venue . Also, the same prosecutors opposed the venue
change. These warnings are the clearest indication that the California charge
was brought to retaliate for the change in venue.
Under this approach DeMarco should be able to establish actual retaliation.
The question now becomes how could a prosecutor avoid losing an additional
175
The district court judge agreed with the government that the tone of the
conversations was not threatening, but held that the "substance surely was."
401 F. Supp. at 508.
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charge in a similar case. Without the threats to add the additional charge, the
facts in DeMarco -actually favor the prosecution. The venue change removed the
policy against simultaneous prosecutions which would explain why the California
charge was not brought from the outset. The lesson is that if prosecutors want
to join unrelated charges they should not threaten to add or modify charges to
talk a defendant out of exercising a pretrial right. One problem with focusing
on the prosecutor's statements is that the prosecutor who is genuinely trying to
tell the defense what they face may inadvertently create the impression he is
threatening to retaliate. A prosecutor should be able to candidly tell the
defense what they are facing without fear that he is helping establish a
vindictiveness claim. The question is not simply whether the prosecutor raised
the specter of a harsher sentence, but did he connect the harsher sentence to
giving up some right.
Is this approach better than following the Goodwin presumed lack of
vindictiveness? I think so. In cases like DeMarco it allows a more reasoned
analysis of the facts and opposing interests in each case, and addresses the
problem the prosecution faced with the policy against simultaneous prosecutions.
Neither the Ninth Circuit's decision nor a rigid application of Goodwin really




The basic notion that due process protects a defendant, from retaliation
after he exercises a right remains after the Goodwin decision. Before a
vindictive prosecution claim can be raised at all, the defendant must first
exercise a constitutional or statutory right and then the prosecutor must change
his charging decision in a manner that exposes the defendant to a harsher
sentence. What has been changed is the standard for deciding a vindictive
prosecution claim once the defense has shown that the increase followed exercise
of a right.
If a defendant is tried after a successful appeal or trial de novo, the
prosecution has the burden of rebutting presumed vindictiveness. Pearce,
Blackledge
,
and Goodwin show that the Supreme Court is primarily concerned with
protecting an individual after he appeals or collaterally attacks his con-
viction. Even though they have insisted that double jeopardy has nothing to do
with the due process protection against retaliation by the prosecutor, their
decisions protect the same values. When a defendant is tried on harsher federal
charges arising from an incident that led to trial by a state, the retrial
presumption is not applicable. The presumption of vindictiveness may be
rebutted by the prosecution. The prosecution has to show objective evidence
that establishes a non-vindictive reason for the increase. The evidence that
will be most likely to succeed is a showing that new information was discovered




The defendant faces a heavier burden when harsher charges are brought after
he exercises a right prior to trial. He must do more than raise the appearance
of retaliation but must prove that the prosecutor retaliated against him because
he exercised that right. In Goodwi
n
the Supreme Court implied that he also must
overcome a presumption that a prosecutor did not intend to retaliate against
him.
If plea bargaining is involved, the defendant will not prevail even if he
can show the harsher charges were brought because he insisted on pleading not
guilty. Plea bargaining negotiations are excepted from the vindictiveness
concept. The prosecution may freely threaten harsher charges to induce a
defendant to give up his right to contest the case against him, and if the
defendant does not plead guilty, bring the harsher charges. If the defendant
has his bargained-for guilty plea later set aside, the prosecution may re-file
the original charges and should be allowed to file any harsher charges that were
a part of the plea negotiations. But I suggest that a presumption of vindic-
tiveness should arise if the prosecution adds charges that were not disclosed
during the plea negotiations prior to the first trial.
Mistrials should be treated as allowing a presumption of vindictiveness
when harsher charges are brought after a defendant successfully moves for a
mistrial. The language in Goodwi
n
supports this conclusion, and the cases that
have dealt with the issue since that decision have applied a presumption of
vindictiveness. The rationale for the presumption, the institutional bias
against retrying a settled question, does not really apply after a mistrial for
there has not been a verdict. But because the prosecution has had an
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opportunity to finalize and prepare its case, and elected to go forward to trial
on the charges, a- realistic likelihood exists that an increase in their severity
is vindictively motivated.
The defendant raises vindictive prosecution by moving to dismiss the
harsher charges; re-sentencing on the lesser charges is not the remedy. Habeas
corpus relief from a state court conviction can be obtained in federal courts,
and a plea of guilty does not bar a defendant from raising the issue on
appeal. If the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied in a federal prosecu-
tion he cannot take an interlocutory appeal of that denial. However, the
178
prosecution can appeal a district court decision in favor of the defendant.
Defense counsel trying to establish pretrial vindictiveness prior to the
initial trial will attempt to show that the prosecutor intended to retaliate
176
See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. at 30-31; Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d
283 (TOT Cir. 1977).
177
In United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982), decided
ten days after Goodwin the Court held that denial of a motion to dismiss is not
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (supp. 1983), or the "collateral
order" exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Corp., 337 U.S. 54 (1949).
The Ninth Circuit reversed charges filed after the defendant changed venue from
Kentucky to California. United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 646 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1981) Previously the Ninth Circuit had allowed interlocutory appeals,
United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir,), cert, denied 449 U.S. 863
(1980), while two other federal circuits had not. United States v. Brizendine,
659 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Gregory, 656 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.
1981). The defendant must exhaust state remedies before a habeas corpus
petition can be heard. Lowrey v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1983).
18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (1184 Supp.) (federal prosecutor may appeal district
court's dismissal of count in indictment or information unless further
prosecution precluded by double jeopardy).
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against the defendant offering by ci rcumstant ial evidence. The factors
suggested in this paper, i.e., nature of the charges, information known to the
prosecutor at the outset, timing, effect of a defendant's exercise of the right,
office pol icy and procedures, and statements by the prosecutor, are relevant in
determining the presence of or lack of such motivation.
Successful vindictive prosecution claims brought prior to trial will
probably decrease as a result of Goodwin . The burden of proving actual
retaliation will be impossible to meet in many cases. But the defense still has
the opportunity to establish actual vindict iveness, and if the trial judge is
persuaded, that factual conclusion should be upheld on appeal. Trial courts now
have the primary responsibility to inquire into the acts and intentions of
prosecutors and face the uncomfortable task of weighing any denial of vindictive
motivation against the circumstances surrounding their increasing the severity
of the charges after a defendant has exercised a pretrial right. The problems
that arise, i.e., potential discovery, potential for wildly different decisions,
and potential problems prosecutors face in deciding whether to establish a
policy on bringing the most severe known charge from the outset or to inform the
defense about a possible increase in the charges, all result from the require-
ment that courts decide the prosecutor's actual motivation. They do not result
from the suggested factors.
Prosecutors should avoid creating the Impression they have retaliated
against a defendant because the trial judge may consider that the objective
facts and circumstances outweigh a denial of vindictive motivation. There is
another reason for prosecutors not to assume Goodwin has shut off successful
75

pretrial vindictiveness claims. The Supreme Court has not been consistent in
this area. Although the Court has provided more protection against vindictive-
ness to defendants who have been convicted, in Goodwin the Court said it was
only being "cautious before (adopting) an inflexible presumption of prosecu-
179
torial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting." The pretrial standard of
actual vindictiveness currently favors the prosecutor. But the Court might
1 on
re-examine that standard if prosecutors do not avoid "upping the ante."
Franklin L. Nolta
1 70
457 U.S. at 381. In Pearce the Court noted that "data have been collected
to show that increased sentences on reconviction are far from rare", citing one
law review note and a letter from an inmate. 395 U.S. at 669 n.20. The reported
cases document that it is not "rare" for a defendant to face harsher charges if
he insists on pleading not guilty, demands a jury trial, or exercises other
pretrial rights. Given the right case, the Court could conclude that a
presumption of vindictiveness standard should apply to pretrial cases. See
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System , 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,30 (1980) (suggesting that federal prosecutors should
carefully follow policies to avoid courts mandating they be followed or charge
will be dismissed); Vorenburg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice
Officials , 4 DUKE L. J. 651, 666-80 (1976) (criticizing the unreviewable
discretion to charge as serving no valid purpose and resulting from default);
Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
,
17 GEO L. REV. 467, 506 (1983)
(arguing that the Court made the distinction between pretrial and posttrial in
Goodwin to avoid overturning Blackledge or Bordenkircher ).
1 on
While the Court could change the standard to apply in pretrial cases, I
think that is unlikely unless it is faced with an outrageous case. Four
justices (Berger, Rehnquist, White, O'Connor) said in Wasman v. United States,
82 L.Ed 2d 424 (1984) that Pearce only protected a defendant from actual
vindictiveness by the sentencing judge. Because Pearce is the foundation for
the Blackledge and the retrial presumption, it appears that those justices would
support an actual vindictiveness standard in retrial as well as pretrial cases.
But in Thigpen v. Roberts, 82 L.Ed. 2d 23 (1984), decided six days before Wasman ,
the majority (including justices White and Berger) made no mention of an actual
vindictiveness standard, and decided the issue as a straightforward application
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